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Abstract
Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) is commonly thought to have attempted to develop
a theory of size for infinite collections that follows the so-called part-whole principle,
according to which the whole is always greater than any of its proper parts. In this
paper, we develop a novel interpretation of Bolzano’s mature theory of the infinite
and show that, contrary to mainstream interpretations, it is best understood as a
theory of infinite sums. Our formal results show that Bolzano’s infinite sums can be
equipped with the rich and original structure of a non-commutative ordered ring,
and that Bolzano’s views on the mathematical infinite are, after all, consistent.
Introduction
Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) was a Bohemian priest with eclectic interests ranging from
logic and mathematics to political and moral philosophy. One of his more famous writings
is a booklet his pupil Př́ıhonský published under the title Paradoxien des Unendlichen
(from now on PU for short), Paradoxes of the Infinite. Likely contributing to its fame,
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this booklet was read and referred to by both Cantor and Dedekind. Perhaps because
of this association, the booklet is also routinely interpreted as a text anticipating several
ideas of Cantor’s transfinite set theory (cf. Berg 1962, 1992; Šebest́ık 1992; Rusnock
2000), especially in sections §§29-33, in which Bolzano sketches a “calculation of the
infinite”. As a consequence, appraisal of the PU is almost exclusively conducted in terms
of how much Bolzano’s work on the infinite agrees with later developments in set theory.
In particular, many shortcomings of Bolzano’s calculation of the infinite are attributed
to his adherence to the part-whole principle:
PW1 For any sets A,B, if A Ĺ B, then sizepAq ă sizepBq.
In the case of infinite sets, it is well-known that this principle contradicts the bijec-
tion principle, according to which the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between
two sets is a necessary and sufficient condition for the equality of their sizes. One locus
classicus for the tension between these two principles is the seventeenth-century dialogue
of Galileo’s Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to Two New Sciences
(Galileo 1958, pp. 44-45). The characters debate among themselves the example of the
set of natural numbers N, which can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the
proper subset Np2q of square natural numbers. Thus N and Np2q have the same size ac-
cording to the bijection principle, while the size of Np2q is strictly smaller than that of N
according to PW1. While Bolzano is commonly taken to have adopted PW1 in the PU,
Cantor successfully founded his theory of powers and cardinal numbers on the bijection
principle. Thus, as long as Cantor’s way out of Galileo’s paradox is perceived as the
“right” way to compute the size of infinite collections, Bolzano’s alternative can only be
seen as an intriguing yet fundamentally flawed attempt.
This privileged status of the bijection principle however has started to be scrutinized
in recent years thanks to a renewed interest in potential alternatives to Cantor’s theory
of the mathematical infinite. In particular, Mancosu (2009) shows that there is a long
historical tradition of thinkers and mathematicians who favored PW1 over the bijection
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principle, and that recent mathematical developments in Benci and Di Nasso (2003) es-
tablish that a consistent theory of the sizes of infinite collections can be founded on PW1
rather than on the bijection principle. This theory, called the theory of numerosities, is
a refinement of the Cantorian theory of cardinals that allows for two sets A and B to be
considered of different sizes even in the presence of a bijection between the two (Benci
and Di Nasso 2003, p. 51). This directly contradicts the claim that Cantor’s theory is the
only viable theory of the infinite, and thus calls for a reappraisal of alternative theories
that until recently had been dismissed as essentially misguided or inconsistent.
Our main goal is to offer such a reappraisal of Bolzano’s mature theory of the math-
ematical infinite. In particular, we propose an interpretation of Bolzano’s calculation of
the infinite in §§29-33 of the PU which stresses its conceptual and mathematical indepen-
dence from set theory proper, and argue that Bolzano is more interested in developing
a theory of infinite sums rather than a way of measuring the sizes of infinite collec-
tions. This leads us to reassess the role that part-whole reasoning plays in Bolzano’s
computations and to provide a formal reconstruction of his position that underscores its
coherence and originality, and is overall a more charitable appreciation of Bolzano’s ideas
on the infinite. In particular, we show that Bolzanian sums in our interpretation form a
non-commutative ordered ring, a well-behaved algebraic structure that nonetheless vastly
differs from Cantorian cardinalities.
We proceed as follows. In Section 1 we discuss several sources of what we call the
received view of the PU, and introduce enough background to set the stage for our novel
interpretation. In Section 2 we focus on Bolzano’s calculation of the infinite and argue
that his work is best understood as a theory of infinite sums. This leads in Sections
3 and 4 to a formal reconstruction of Bolzano’s computations with infinite quantities,
which aims to establish both the consistency and the originality of his position. Finally,
in Section 5, we recap the main points of our formalization and discuss its implications
for the interpretation of the PU.
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1 The received view on the PU
Bolzano’s PU is a short yet ambitious booklet in which the author aims to show that, when
properly defined and handled, the concept of the infinite is not intrinsically contradictory,
and many paradoxes having to do with the infinite in mathematics (but also in physics
and metaphysics) can actually be solved. In the course of addressing the paradoxes
of the infinite in mathematics, Bolzano develops what looks like a theory of transfinite
quantities (§§28-29, 32-33), which is what commentators tend to focus on when appraising
the contents of the PU.
One such commentator is, as is known (Šebest́ık 1992; Rusnock 2000; Ferreirós 2007),
Georg Cantor. Cantor (1883) introduces Bolzano as a proponent of actual infinity, and
specifically actually infinite numbers in mathematics, in contrast to Leibniz’s arguments
against infinite numbers:
Still, the actual infinite such as we confront for example in the well-defined
point sets or in the constitution of bodies out of point-like atoms [. . . ] has
found its most authoritative defender in Bernard Bolzano, one of the most
perceptive philosophers and mathematicians of our century, who has devel-
oped his views on the topic in the beautiful and rich script Paradoxes of the
Infinite, Leipzig 1851. The aim is to prove how the contradictions of the infi-
nite sought for by the sceptics and peripatetics of all times do not exist at all,
as soon as one makes the not always quite easy effort of taking into account
the concepts of the infinite according to their true content. (Cantor 1883 in
Cantor 1932, p. 179)1
And still:
1In this and all other cases for which a published English translation is not cited, the translations are
the authors’. Original German:
Doch den entschiedensten Verteidiger hat das Eigentlich-unendliche, wie es uns beispielsweise in den
wohldefinierten Punktmengen oder in der Konstitution der Körper aus punktuellen Atomen [. . . ] entge-
gentritt, in einem höchst scharfsinnigen Philosophen und Mathematiker unseres Jahrhunderts, in Bernard
Bolzano gefunden, der seine betreffenden Ansichten namentlich in der schönen und gehaltreichen Schrift:
,,Paradoxien des Unendlichen, Leipzig 1851” entwickelt hat, deren Zweck es ist, nachzuweisen, wie die von
Skeptikern und Peripatetikern aller Zeiten im Unendlichen gesuchten Widersprüche gar nicht vorhanden
sind, sobald man sich nur die freilich nicht immer ganz leichte Mühe nimmt, die Unendlichkeitsbegriffe
allen Ernstes ihrem wahren Inhalte nach in sich aufzunehmen.
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Bolzano is perhaps the only one who confers a certain status to actually
infinite numbers, or at least they are often mentioned [by him]; nevertheless I
completely and wholly disagree with the way in which he handles them, not
being able to formulate a proper definition thereof, and I consider for instance
§§29-33 of that book as untenable and wrong. For a genuine definition of
actually infinite numbers, the author is lacking both the general concept of
power, and the accurate concept of number. It is true that the seeds of both
notions appear in a few places in the form of special cases, but it seems to
me he does not work his way through to full clarity and distinction, and this
explains several contradictions and even a few mistakes of this worthwhile
script. (ibid., p. 180)2
Cantor’s comments in many ways set the tone of how the PU are mainly perceived
even today, namely as a rich and interesting essay that nevertheless displays some se-
rious shortcomings. Cantor diagnoses Bolzano’s mistakes as being fundamentally due
to an imprecise characterization of power and number. Without entering a discussion
on Cantorian powers, it is useful for us to notice how Cantor is readily reinterpreting
Bolzano’s text in the light of his own research. The concept and terminology of powers
was Cantor’s own, which he introduced starting from 1878 in his papers. What Cantor
means is that Bolzano did not have the right notion of size for infinite sets, the right
notion being Cantor’s own powers, and this shortcoming causes Bolzano to go astray in
§§29-33. Another aspect of Cantor’s comments on the PU which we want to stress is
that Cantor straightforwardly presents Bolzano’s “calculation of the infinite” (Rechnung
des Unendlichen, §28) as a version of his own transfinite arithmetic, albeit imprecise and
imperfect.
2Bolzano ist vielleicht der einzige, bei dem die eigentlich-unendlichen Zahlen zu einem gewissen Rechte
kommen, wenigstens ist von ihnen vielfach die Rede; doch stimme ich gerade in der Art, wie er mit
ihnen umgeht, ohne eine rechte Definition von ihnen aufstellen zu können, ganz und gar nicht mit ihm
überein und sehe beispielsweise die §§29-33 jenes Buches als haltlos und irrig an. Es fehlt dem Autor zur
wirklichen Begriffsfassung bestimmt-unendlicher Zahlen sowohl der allgemeine Mächtigkeitsbegriff, wie
auch der präzise Anzahlbegriff. Beide treten zwar an einzelnen Stellen ihrem Keime nach in Form von
Spezialitäten bei ihm auf, er arbeitet sich aber dabei zu der vollen Klarheit und Bestimmtheit, wie mir
scheint, nicht durch, und daraus erklären sich viele Inkonsequenzen und selbst manche Irrtümer dieser
wertvollen Schrift.
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All commentaries on the PU we were able to find seem to follow suit from Cantor in
that they evaluate and interpret the PU, and §§29-33 in particular, against the backdrop
of the development of set theory. Thus Bolzano’s PU are about infinite sets according
to editors and translators of Bolzano’s text (e.g., Hans Hahn in Bolzano 1920, Donald
Steele in Bolzano 1950), as well as scholars such as Berg (1992, 1962), Šebest́ık (1992,
2017), Lapointe (2011), Ferreirós (2007) and Rusnock (2000). We now examine the most
informative of these interpretations in some detail.
Among Bolzano scholars, Jan Berg is perhaps the one that embraces a set theoretic
reading of Bolzano with the most conviction. Berg (1962, p. 176) writes:
In PU [. . . ] Bolzano repudiates the notion of equivalence as sufficient condi-
tion for the identity of powers of infinite sets. [. . . ] As a result, a number
of statements follow which do not correspond to Cantor’s view on this sub-
ject. E.g., if “N0” denotes the number of natural numbers (PU 45) [§29; Berg
refers to the page of the 1851 edition], then in the series: N0, N0
2, N0
3, . . .
each N0
m is said to “exceed infinitely” the preceding term N0
m´1 (PU 46)
[§29]. But Bolzano’s comparison of the powers of infinite sets is impossible to
understand, since nowhere does he offer any clear sufficient condition for the
equinumerousness of infinite sets.
Berg makes the same points as Cantor, namely that Bolzano’s writings in PU are
about the powers of infinite sets, and that his reasoning is impossible to follow as he
does not offer sufficient conditions for the equality of size of sets. However Berg (see,
for instance, his 1962, p. 177) remains convinced that a letter3 written by Bolzano in
the last year of his life witnesses a change of heart regarding how infinite sets should be
compared, moving from his rejection of one-to-one correspondence to an acceptance of it
3This letter, dated 9 March 1848 and intended for Bolzano’s former pupil Robert Zimmermann, has
been published in (Bolzano 1978, pp. 187-189). Berg is the editor for the volume and his editorial notes to
the letter are a reiteration of his interpretation of Bolzano having changed his mind regarding part-whole
and one-to-one correspondence for infinite collections.
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as a sufficient criterion for size equality.
On the heels of this interpretation, Berg (1992, pp. 42-43) sketches what he takes to
be Bolzano’s theory of the infinite. In a nutshell, Berg believes that any two infinite sets
of natural numbers are of the same size according to Bolzano just in case “the members
are related to each other by finitely many rational operations (addition, multiplication
and their inverses)” (Berg 1992). Even though Berg does not use this terminology, his
interpretation seems to suggest that N is equinumerous with an infinite subset S Ď N
whenever the bijection f : S Ñ N is primitive recursive. This is an interesting suggestion,
but it would imply that, for example, N´ t1u and N are equinumerous, while this seems
to contradict Bolzano’s reasoning in PU §29 (see Section 2 below). Moreover, Berg’s
interpretation of the letter is far from uncontroversial (see Rusnock 2000, pp. 194-195,
Šebest́ık 1992, pp. 469-470, to be discussed below, and Mancosu 2009, 2016), so his in-
terpretation of this aspect of Bolzano’s work is not a foregone conclusion. We will not
engage with it any more than what we have already done as the controversy has less to
do with PU and more to do with what views about the infinite Bolzano held at the very
moment of his death.
A more nuanced view is offered by Šebest́ık (1992, pp. 435-473). When presenting the
contribution of Bolzano’s PU, Šebest́ık summarizes it thus:
For the first time, the actual infinite, whose properties cease to be contra-
dictory to simply become paradoxical, is admitted in mathematics as a well-
defined concept, having a referent and only attaching to those objects capable
of enumeration or measurement, that is, to sets and quantities.4 (Šebest́ık
1992, p. 435)
Šebest́ık also interprets the PU as about sets and their being infinite. Even though
at p. 445 he more faithfully writes that “the infinite is first and foremost a property
4Original French: Pour la première fois, l’infini actuel dont les propriétés cessent d’être cotradictoires
pour devenir simplement paradoxales, est admis en mathématiques à titre de concept défini, ayant
une référence et attaché aux seuls objets susceptibles de dénombrement ou de mesure, c’est-à-dire aux
ensembles et aux grandeurs.
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of pluralities [our emphasis]”,5 on p. 462 he then reverts to set talk at a crucial point,
namely when giving his interpretation of PU §33:
[Referring to §33] It is the first and last time within the Paradoxes of the
Infinite that Bolzano deduces from the reflexivity of the set of natural numbers
to the equality of number between a set and one of its proper subsets.6
According to Šebest́ık’s interpretation then, and unlike Berg’s, it is not quite the
case that Bolzano changed his mind regarding what criterion to use to compare the size
of infinite sets after the PU and just before his death. Rather, Bolzano’s views in the
PU itself are already inconsistent, because at various points in the text Bolzano either
implicitly or explicitly endorses the following views:
1. The part-whole principle, that is, the whole is greater than any of its proper parts.
2. All infinite sets can be put in one-to-one correspondence with any of their infinite
subsets.
3. Every set has a definite size.
4. If two sets are in one-to-one correspondence then they have the same plurality.
It is quite telling that for 1, 3, and 4 Šebest́ık (1992, pp. 463-464) feels the need to
add set theoretic glosses, so that 1 becomes “cardpAq ă cardpBq iff A is equivalent to a
proper part of B” (‘cardpAq ă cardpBq si et seulement si A est équivalent à une partie
propre de B’), 3 is Every set has a “unique cardinal number” (‘nombre cardinal unique’)
and 4 If two sets are in one-to-one correspondence then they have “the same cardinal
number” (‘ont le même nombre cardinal’).
Thus formulated, 1-4 do indeed yield a contradiction. Consider any two infinite sets
A and B such that A is a proper part of B. By 3, they each have a unique cardinal-
ity, and by 1 cardpAq ă cardpBq. But also, since A and B can be put into one-to-one
5Original: “L’infini est d’abord et avant tout une propriété des multitudes”.
6C’est pour la première et dernière fois que, dans les Paradoxes de l’Infini, Bolzano conclut de la
réflexivité de l’ensemble des nombres naturels à l’égalité numérique entre un ensemble et l’un de ses
sous-ensembles propres.
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correspondence (by 2), they have the same cardinality, by 4, so cardpAq “ cardpBq, con-
tradicting our earlier deduction that cardpAq ă cardpBq. We will give our argument as
per why Šebest́ık’s contradiction does not go through in Section 2, where we highlight
that a crucial ingredient in this family of counterexamples to Bolzano’s claim to internal
consistency in the PU is largely due to the set theoretic interpretation of 4.
The last interpretation we want to consider in detail is Rusnock’s (2000). Rusnock
(2000, p. 193) writes that in §§21-22 Bolzano “apparently based this opinion [of the
insufficiency of one-to-one correspondence for equality of size] on considerations involving
parts and wholes, assuming perhaps that the multiplicity of the whole must be greater
than those of its parts. (Rusnock translates with “multiplicity” what we, following (Russ
2004), translate as “plurality”, namely Vielheit.) Rusnock (2000, ibid.) then continues:
But this seems to be a mistake, even in Bolzano’s own terms. For his sets
(Mengen) are by definition invariant under rearrangements of their members,
and thus the appeal to the “mode of determination” seems to be illegitimate
in this context.
Rusnock then produces an example to show why Bolzano is mistaken by his own
lights when embracing “considerations of parts and whole”. Consider the straight line
abc, where a is to the left of b and b is to the left of c; call A the set of points between
a and b, B the set of points between a and c. Then it is possible to map each point of
A to a point of B via a translation map that is also a one-to-one correspondence. Since
a translation map only “rearranges” points from one region of space to another, then B
is just a rearrangement of A. Thus, A and B should be the same “set”, since Bolzano’s
definition of “set” (Menge) entails that something considered as a “set” is invariant under
rearrangement of parts. Yet, because A is a proper part of B, A should be strictly smaller
than B, in virtue of what from now on we call “the part-whole principle”: The whole is
greater than any of its proper parts. This principle then is inconsistent with Bolzano’s
own definition of multitude.
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It is not warranted however that an example such as Rusnock’s really counts as a re-
arrangement of parts on Bolzano’s terms, essentially because it relies on a metaphorical
use of the term “rearrangement” in a geometric context. This metaphorical use in turn
suggests conceiving of geometric figures (points and lines) as objects that move through
the two-dimensional (Euclidean) space. Yet Bolzano famously rejected metaphorical talk
of motion in mathematical contexts (Bolzano 1817, Introduction), and lacking that, we
are not sure there is a way of rephrasing Rusnock’s example so that it really counts as a
rearrangement of parts on Bolzano’s terms.
On the basis of our overview, we can now distil the received view about the PU into
two theses:
(Sets) In §§29-33, Bolzano is concerned with determining size relationships between
infinite sets.
(Set-PW) Bolzano’s computations in §§29-33 are, at least partially, motivated by the
part-whole principle for sets.
As we have seen above, the combination of these two theses motivates a reading of
Bolzano’s calculation of the infinite as a pre-Cantorian transfinite arithmetic that is either
mistaken or downright inconsistent because of its adherence to the part-whole principle.
As it will soon become apparent, we believe however that both theses incorrectly describe
§§29-33 of the PU. Our main claim is that the standard view’s identification of Bolzanian
collections with the modern notion of set, and of all instances of part-whole reasoning
in the PU to PW1, is too quick. Discussing the standard interpretation of Bolzano’s
calculation of the infinite therefore requires a clarification of the status of collections
in the PU, and an assessment of the role that part-whole reasoning plays in Bolzano’s
arguments. We will take those two issues in turn. First, we briefly recap the various
notions of collections that Bolzano introduces at the beginning of the PU, and explain
the role they play in his definition of the infinite. Second, we review sections §§20-24
of the PU, in which Bolzano is usually interpreted as rejecting the bijection principle in
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favor of something like PW1. We believe this will provide the reader with the necessary
background for our in-depth discussion of §§29-33 in Section 2.
1.1 Bolzano’s collections, multitudes, and sums
Bolzano’s first goal in the PU is to arrive at a rigorous definition of the infinite. To that
end, he relies on his logical system first developed in his Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of
Science, WL for short). In particular, Bolzano devotes the first section of the PU to
defining several distinct notions of collection. Without going into too much detail, we
summarize here the most important definitions.
Collection The concept of collection (Inbegriff ) applies to any and all objects which
are made of parts, i.e. that are not simple. In that sense, [collection] is the most
general concept as it applies to any composite object. Collections, as opposed to
units (Einheiten, sometimes also translated as unity/unities), can be decomposed
into simpler parts. Anything that is made of at least two parts is a collection. (see
PU §3)
Multitude The concept of multitude (Menge) is best illustrated with Bolzano’s own
example of a drinking glass (PU §6). Consider the glass as intact, and then as
shattered into pieces. What changes between these two states of the glass is the
arrangement (Anordnung) of the pieces, although the amount of glass is the same
before and after. When we consider the glass as that which remains unchanged
before and after the breakage, we are considering it as a multitude. “A collection
which we put under a concept so that the arrangement of its parts is unimpor-
tant (in which therefore nothing essential changes for us if we merely change this
arrangement) I call a multitude.” (PU §4)7
Plurality When the parts of a multitude all fall under the same concept A and are
therefore considered as units of kindA (i.e. simple objects of kindA), that multitude
is called a plurality (Vielheit) of kind A. (ibid.)
7Translations of Bolzano’s PU are always from Russ 2004.
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Sum A sum (Summe) is a collection such that (a) its parts can also be collections, and
(b) the parts of its parts can be considered as parts of the whole sum, without the
sum itself having changed (PU §5). Consider the glass example again. Suppose we
break our glass G and it shatters in exactly three pieces, a, b and c. Then suppose
a breaks also into two pieces a1 and a2. Then our glass G, considered as a sum, is
still the same: G “ a` b` c “ a1 ` a2 ` b` c.
Quantity Bolzano defines a quantity (Größe) as an object that can be considered of a
kind A such that any two objects M,N of kind A satisfy a certain law of trichotomy
(not Bolzano’s expression): either they are equal to one another (M “ N) or “one
of them presents itself as a sum which includes a part equal to the other one” (PU
§6), that is to say, M “ N ` ν or N “M `µ. The remaining parts µ, ν themselves
also need to satisfy the condition that, for any other X of kind A, either X “ µ
(X “ ν, respectively) or one of them can be presented as a sum of which the other
is just a part.
To avoid any confusion, it should be noted that the concepts of multitudes, pluralities,
sums and quantities are specifications of the concept of collections, and the same object
can be conceptualized as more than one kind of collection at once. Quantities are a
great example. From their definition, it is clear that anything that is a quantity is also
a plurality, because a quantity is a multitude (of a certain kind, say A) whose parts are
also objects of kind A. At the same time, the way Bolzano expresses the trichotomy
law holding of relationships between quantities suggests that a quantity is also a sum,
namely, an object such that the parts of its immediate parts are also parts of the object
itself, and nothing about the object changes if we consider it as made of the parts of its
parts, instead of just of its own immediate parts.
Moreover, the existence of various notions of collections in Bolzano’s framework is
at odds with the thesis (Sets) of the received view, according to which Bolzano tries
to develop an arithmetic of infinite sets. Indeed, it is far from clear that any of the
notions described above can be straightforwardly mapped onto the modern notion of a
set. Following Incurvati (2020, p. 11), we consider the concept of set as used in (philosophy
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of) mathematics contexts to be sufficiently individuated by the three criteria:
(Unity) A set is a single entity over and above its elements.
(Decomposition) A set can be decomposed in a unique way into its elements.
(Extensionality) Sets are identical if and only if they have exactly the same elements.
Bolzano’s own definitions do not imply that his multitudes, or pluralities, or sums satisfy
all three criteria at once. Since multitudes, pluralities and sums are the infinite collections
Bolzano concerns himself with, the identification of his infinite collections with Cantorian
infinite sets is unwarranted and far from obvious. For more on Bolzano’s multitudes and
sets, see Simons (1997).
Nevertheless, (Sets) might gain some traction from the fact that Bolzano’s definition
of the infinite only applies to collections, or, more precisely, to pluralities:
[. . . ] I shall call a plurality which is greater than every finite one, i.e., a
plurality which has the property that every finite multitude represents only a
part of it, an infinite plurality. (PU §9)
However, the choice of defining an infinite plurality as opposed to simply infinity is
justified in §10, where Bolzano argues that in the use made by mathematicians, “the
infinite” is always an infinite plurality:
Therefore it [is] only a question of whether through a mere definition of what
is called an infinite plurality we are in a position to determine what is [the
nature of] the infinite in general. This would be the case if it should prove
that, strictly speaking, there is nothing other than pluralities to which the
concept of infinity may be applied in its true meaning, i.e., if it should prove
that infinity is really only a property of a plurality or that everything which
we have defined as infinite is only called so because, and in so far as, we
discover a property in it which can be regarded as an infinite plurality. Now
it seems to me that is really the case. The mathematician obviously never
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uses this word in any other sense. For generally it is nearly always quantities
with whose determination he is occupied and for which he makes use of the
assumption of one of those of the same kind for the unit, and then of the
concept of a number. (PU §10)
Bolzano’s target when defining infinity solely as the attribute of certain collections are
the imprecise definitions of infinity given by some philosophers (Hegel and his followers
are cited explicitly here) who consider the mathematical infinity Bolzano talks about to
be the “bad” kind (PU §11), while the one true infinity is God’s absolute infinity. The
strategy to push against this qualitative infinite of the philosophers is to show that, even
in the case of God, who is the unity par excellence, when we assign infinity to Him as
one of His attributes, what we are really saying is that some other attribute of His has
an infinite multitude as a component.
What I do not concede is merely that the philosopher may know an object on
which he is justified in conferring the predicate of being infinite without first
having identified in some respect an infinite magnitude [Größe] or plurality in
this object. If I can prove that even in God as that being which we consider
as the most perfect unity, viewpoints can be identified from which we see
in him an infinite plurality, and that it is only from these viewpoints that
we attribute infinity to him, then it will hardly be necessary to demonstrate
further that similar considerations underlie all other cases where the concept
of infinity is well justified. Now I say we call God infinite because we concede
to him powers of more than one kind that have an infinite magnitude. Thus
we must attribute to him a power of knowledge that is true omniscience, that
therefore comprehends an infinite multitude of truths because all truths in
general etc. (PU §11)
With that, Bolzano considers himself to have exhaustively argued for his definition
of mathematical infinity as being inextricable from the concepts of plurality and quan-
tity and inapplicable to the one-ness of any unity, even God. Thus, we conclude that
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Bolzano’s insistence on defining only an infinite plurality does not lend particular credence
to (Sets) after all. Bolzano’s definition unequivocally makes of infinity a quantifying at-
tribute which, as such, can only apply to pluralities and quantities. But his insistence on
discussing only infinite pluralities should be understood as in contrast with the Hegelian
infinite as an attribute of a single infinite being. Talking about infinite collections, for
Bolzano, is a way of clearly setting apart the quantitative infinite he is interested in from
the qualitative infinite of the hegelians.
1.2 Bolzano’s commitment to part-whole in the PU
As the discussion of the received view on the PU made clear, one point of contention in
interpreting Bolzano’s work on the infinite is whether (and to what extent) the principles
that guide his computations with infinite quantities mirror those later used by Cantor.
While part-whole considerations play an important role in Bolzano’s WL (in particular,
§102 therein; cf. Mancosu 2016, pp. 130-131, Mancosu 2009, pp. 624-625), the discussion
in Berg and Šebest́ık’s interpretations has brought to light the issue of whether, on the
whole, Bolzano’s treatment of infinite quantities in the PU obeys the part-whole principle
or not. Setting aside the issue of whether an adoption of one-to-one correspondence is
implicit in Bolzano’s §33 (something we will come back to in Section 2), here we review
§§20-24, which are usually taken to be Bolzano’s discussion of one-to-one correspondence
as an insufficient criterion for size equality of infinite collections on the grounds of part-
whole considerations.
Let us note first that some form of part-whole reasoning seems to be present in the
very notion of “being greater/smaller than” employed in the PU, as this passage from
§19 witnesses:
Even with the examples of the infinite considered so far it could not escape
our notice that not all infinite multitudes are to be regarded as equal to one
another in respect of their plurality, but that some of them are greater (or
smaller) than others, i.e., another multitude is contained as a part in one
multitude (or on the contrary one multitude occurs in another as a mere
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part). (PU §19)
Here, Bolzano glosses the claim that some multitudes are greater than others as some
containing others as a part. A similar use of the part-whole principle is to be found in
§20, when Bolzano compares the size of the collection of quantities smaller than 5 and
the size of the collection of those smaller than 12:
If we take two arbitrary (abstract) quantities, e.g. 5 and 12, then it is clear
that the multitude of quantities which there are between zero and 5 (or which
are smaller than 5) is infinite, likewise also the multitude of quantities which
are smaller than 12 is infinite. And equally certainly the latter multitude is
greater since the former is indisputably only a part of it. (PU §20)
This suggests that Bolzano’s writings commit him to upholding the part-whole prin-
ciple even when it comes to the comparison of infinite quantities, because the principle
is part and parcel of the definition of the order relation among quantities.
Having thus established Bolzano’s commitment to part-whole, let us also show his
explicit rejection of what nowadays we call one-to-one correspondence as a sufficient
criterion for equality of size for infinite collections:
I claim that two multitudes, that are both infinite, can stand in such a rela-
tionship to each other that, on the one hand, it is possible to combine each
thing belonging to one multitude, with a thing of the other multitude, into a
pair, with the result that no single thing in both multitudes remains without
connection to a pair, and no single thing appears in two or more pairs, and
also, on the other hand it is possible that one of these multitudes contains
the other in itself as a mere part, so that the pluralities which they represent
if we consider the members of them all as equal, i.e., as units, have the most
varied relationships to one another. (PU §20)
In the quote above, Bolzano remarks that it is possible for two infinite multitudes
to both be in a one-to-one correspondence with each other and be related as a part to
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its whole. This state of affairs can have the appearance of a paradox, because in the
finite case checking whether two multitudes can be put into one-to-one correspondence
suffices to determine whether they have the same number of terms, whereas the part-whole
relation implies that one multitude must be greater than the other. Bolzano insists that
the part-whole relation is what determines the greater-than relation, too:
Therefore merely for the reason that two multitudes A and B stand in such
a relation to one another that to every part a occurring in one of them A,
we can seek out according to a certain rule, a part b occurring in B, with the
result that all the pairs pa` bq which we form in this way contain everything
which occurs in A or B and contains each thing only once—merely from
this circumstance we can—as we see—in no way conclude that these two
multitudes are equal to one another if they are infinite with respect to the
plurality of their parts (i.e., if we disregard all differences between them). But
rather they are able, in spite of that relationship between them that is the
same for both of them, to have a relationship of inequality in their plurality,
so that one of them can be presented as a whole, of which the other is a part.
(PU §21)
This consideration is illustrated in the preceding §20 by way of two examples, or, two
versions of the same example, which considers the two intervals p0, 5q and p0, 12q on the
real line and concludes that, since p0, 5q is only a part of p0, 12q, p0, 12q contains more
quantities (or more points) than p0, 5q.
The reason why one has to drop the apparently successful one-to-one correspondence
criterion when considering infinite quantities is that what makes one-to-one correspon-
dence work in the finite case is precisely that one has to do with finite collections; hence
at some point the process of pairing off each element from the collection with a natural
number stops, whereas in the infinite case there is no last element, so the pairing-off never
ends. Hence the need for a different criterion for size comparison (PU §22). Bolzano gives
a brief explanation of how one-to-one correspondence does not suffice to reach conclusions
regarding comparisons of infinite sums in §24:
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[From the proposition of §20] follows as the next consequence of it that we may
not immediately put equal to one another, two sums of quantities which are
equal to one another pair-wise (i.e., every one from one with every one from
the other), if their multitude is infinite, unless we have convinced ourselves
that the infinite plurality of these quantities in both sums is the same. That
the summands determine their sums, and that therefore equal summands also
give equal sums, is indeed completely indisputable, and holds not only if the
multitude of these summands is finite but also if it is infinite. But because
there are different infinite multitudes, in the latter case it must also be proved
that the infinite multitude of these summands in the one sum is exactly the
same as in the other. But by our proposition it is in no way sufficient, to be
able to conclude this, if in some way one can discover for every term occurring
in one sum, another equal to it in the other sum. Instead this can only be
concluded with certainty if both multitudes have the same basis for their
determination. (PU §24)
Bolzano considers here the case of a one-to-one correspondence between the terms of
two infinite sums S1 and S2 that would map each term in S1 to an equal term in S2.
Since the existence of a one-to-one correspondence is not enough to guarantee that S1
and S2 have the same number of terms, one cannot conclude that S1 and S2 are equal,
unless the two sums also have the same “basis for their determination”. This phrase does
not have, to our knowledge, a standard interpretation in Bolzanian scholarship. Šebest́ık
(1992, p. 460) does attempt an explanation of what the “determining elements” (bestim-
mende Stücke) of an object can be, according to Bolzano. However, we are not convinced
that the explanation offered there extends to a notion of determination for mathematical
entities. For now, we simply draw the reader’s attention to the fact that Bolzano con-
cludes his discussion of the one-to-one correspondence criterion with a methodological
point about infinite sums which plays a crucial role in §32 and §33 (see Section 2.2 and
Section 2.3 below).
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To sum up, in this section we have presented what we take to be the received view
on Bolzano’s calculation of the infinite, and shown that it relies on the two theses (Sets)
and (Set-PW). We have argued that the existence of various notions of collections in
Bolzano’s framework puts some pressure on (Sets), as it does not seem obvious that any
of Bolzano’s notions closely matches our modern notion of set. Regarding (Set-PW)
we have shown how Bolzano appeals in §§20-24 to part-whole reasoning in the context
of determining size relationships between certain infinite collections. However, we also
noted that, by §24, Bolzano has pivoted from discussing sufficient criteria for the equality
of size of two infinite collections to discussing sufficient criteria for the equality of two
infinite sums. As we will argue in the next section, this is a crucial shift in perspective
that is missed by the standard interpretation of Bolzano’s calculation of the infinite. We
now turn to a close analysis of the text and to our arguments in favour of a different
reading of PU §§29-33.
2 Bolzano’s calculation of the infinite
As discussed in the previous section, up to §24 Bolzano has established the following facts
about infinite multitudes and pluralities:
1. Some infinite multitudes are greater than others “with respect to their plurality”
(§19).
2. Two infinite multitudes can both be related as part and whole and be in a one-to-one
correspondence (§20).
3. One-to-one correspondence is not sufficient to determine equality of infinite multi-
tudes (§§21-22).
4. In the case of comparing two infinite sums, if one wants to conclude that they are
equal, one needs to make sure both that there are as many summands in one as
there are in the other and that each term from one sum is equal to the corresponding
one in the other sum (§24).
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These are the “basic rules” (Grundregeln, PU §28) which govern a proper handling of
the infinite in mathematics. Bolzano is aware however that his readers might still be
skeptical towards the possibility of computing with the infinite, so he explains what he
means by “calculation of the infinite” in the following passage:
Even the concept of a calculation of the infinite has, I admit, the appearance of
being self-contradictory. To want to calculate something means to attempt a
determination of something through numbers. But how can one determine the
infinite through numbers—that infinite which according to our own definition
must always be something which we can consider as a multitude consisting of
infinitely many parts, i.e., as a multitude which is greater than every number,
which therefore cannot possibly be determined by the statement of a mere
number? But this doubtfulness disappears if we take into account that a
calculation of the infinite done correctly does not aim at a calculation of that
which is determinable through no number, namely not a calculation of the
infinite plurality in itself, but only a determination of the relationship of one
infinity to another. This is a matter which is feasible, in certain cases at any
rate, as we shall show by several examples. (PU §28)
Bolzano’s calculation of the infinite is minimal. He does not purport to have extended
the concept of number so as to introduce infinite numbers (pace Cantor—see Section 1
above),8 but he aims to study the relationship—that is, the ratios as well as the “greater
than” relation—between two infinities whenever this can be done in a sound way, that
is, in accordance with the principles he has argued for in the preceding portion of the
PU. Armed with such principles, Bolzano can show his reader how to properly handle
some apparently paradoxical results in mathematics, starting from the general theory of
quantity.
8As Mancosu (2016, p. 163) notes, this refusal to admit infinite numbers was not unique to Bolzano’s
position but was shared also by Dedekind (1888) and perhaps Schröder (1873).
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2.1 Computing with infinite sums
The first computations with infinite quantities are found in earnest in §29; as we will see,
these quantities are always introduced and treated as sums.
Bolzano introduces the symbol
0
N through a symbolic equation—that is, an equation
which establishes that the reference of two signs is the same (cf. definition in Grössenlehre,
Bolzano 1975, pp. 131-132) —to stand for the Menge of all natural numbers. He then
introduces
n
N to stand for the Menge of all natural numbers strictly greater than n P N.
1
S, on the other hand (which is first introduced as
0
S), is the symbol for the sum of all
natural numbers.
In Bolzano’s words:
[. . . ] if we denote the series of natural numbers by
1, 2, 3, 4, ..., n, n` 1, . . . in inf.
then the expression
1` 2` 3` 4` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` n` pn` 1q ` . . . in inf.
will be the sum of these natural numbers, and the following expression
10 ` 20 ` 30 ` 40 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` n0 ` pn` 1q0 ` . . . in inf.
in which the single summands, 10, 20, 30, . . . all represent mere units, repre-
sents just the number [Menge] of all natural numbers. If we designate this by
0
N and therefore form the merely symbolic equation
10 ` 20 ` 30 ` 40 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` n0 ` pn` 1q0 ` . . . in inf. “
0
N (1)
and in the same way we designate the number [Menge] of natural numbers
from pn` 1q by
n
N , and therefore form the equation




Then we obtain by subtraction the certain and quite unobjectionable equation





This passage mentions several notions that will be central to the remainder of our
analysis of Bolzano’s PU, hence we will briefly go over them now.
First is the notion of “series” (Reihe), which Bolzano defines (PU §7) as a collection
of “terms” (Glieder) a, b, c, d, . . . such that for each term c there is exactly another term d
such that, by using the same rule for any pair c, d we can obtain (determine, bestimmen)
c by applying said rule to d, or the inverse rule to c to obtain d instead. The natural
numbers, that is, the “whole numbers” (ganze Zahlen) are defined as a series of objects
of a certain kind A where the first term is a unit of kind A and the subsequent terms are
sums obtained by adding one unit to their immediate predecessor.
The second concept we want to introduce is that of Gliedermenge (alternatively ex-
pressed by Bolzano as Gliedermenge, Menge von Gliedern or Menge der Glieder). As
one can infer from PU §9, Bolzano considers any number series to have a Gliedermenge.
Because a Gliedermenge is said to be sometimes greater, sometimes smaller, it seems
reasonable to assume that this Gliedermenge is, if not a quantity properly said, at least
something that can be quantified, i.e., treated as a quantity. In the passage we quote from
§29, Bolzano introduces first the series of all natural numbers, then their sum and the
Menge of such a sum. Given what was just said about series and Gliedermenge thereof,
this occurrence of the word Menge should be read as a shorthand for Gliedermenge or
one of its synonyms.
This occurrence of Menge is therefore at odds with any interpretation of Bolzano’s
definition of “multitude”(Menge) that sees it as (almost) synonymous with “set” in the
modern sense. If the concept of multitude is virtually identical with that of set, then
the multitude of 1 ` 2 ` 3 ` 4 ` . . . in inf. should be just 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . in inf. and not
1` 1` 1` 1` . . . in inf. For the sake of preserving coherence in Bolzano’s work in PU
§§29-33 it is therefore sensible to insist that “Gliedermenge” is a quantitative concept.
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As a consequence, since we believe that translating Menge here as “set”, like Steele
(Bolzano 1950), or “multitude”, as we would have to if we were to translate Menge
rigidly, obfuscates this quantitative aspect of the concept of “Gliedermenge”, we prefer
to respect Russ’s (2004) choice and translate Menge as “number” when it seems to be
short for Menge der Glieder or similar. As long as it is clear that we do not think Bolzano
is introducing here genuine infinite numbers (in the sense of the German Zahlen), we will
translate Menge as “number” in these contexts.
0
N thus denotes the number (Menge) of all natural numbers, and for any natural
number n,
n
N represents the size of the collection of all natural numbers strictly greater
than n. This is all written as follows:
10 ` 20 ` 30 ` 40 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` n0 ` pn` 1q0 “
0
N (4)
pn` 1q0 ` pn` 2q0 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ “
n
N (5)
The 0th power works in the standard way here, meaning n0 “ 1 for any natural number
n. So for instance the size of the set of all natural numbers up to n is 10` 20` 30` 40`





N , Bolzano proceeds to show how they can be added or multi-
plied with one another thanks to distributivity. One then obtains a hierarchy of infinite




















The notion of quantities being of different orders of infinity does not start with Bolzano
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and already existed in the context of infinitesimal calculus.9 However, we will argue in
Section 4 that Bolzano’s computation of the product of infinite quantities is in fact very
original and hence very significant for a comparison with Cantor’s theory of the infinite
(which we carry out in Section 5).
Having looked carefully at Bolzano’s first computations with infinite sums, we now
proceed to our next piece of evidence for interpreting Bolzano as primarily interested in
infinite sums, namely, §32 of the PU.
2.2 Grandi’s series
In PU §32, Bolzano criticizes a report by a certain M.R.S. in Gergonne’s Annales (M.R.S. 1830)
which purports to prove that the infinite sum




The series Bolzano focuses on is sometimes called Grandi’s series after the Italian
18th century monk who first tried to compute a value for this infinite sum. Kline (1983)
reports that this series was an object of great interest for mathematicians throughout the
19th century, that “caused endless dispute”(Kline 1983, pp. 307-308). It is not necessary
for our summary of Bolzano’s views to rehash the whole debate surrounding Grandi’s
series (and other divergent series) in great detail, though it is perhaps worth mentioning
that Grandi’s opinion, that the value of this series should be a
2
, was shared also by Leibniz
(Kline 1983, p. 307). Kline also reports that Leibniz’s argument—which differed from
Grandi’s—was accepted by the Bernoulli brothers. This acceptance notwithstanding, by
the time Bolzano is active there is still no clear consensus on how to treat what we would
now consider divergent series. For Bolzano and his contemporaries, the question of how
to assign a value to infinite sums such as Grandi’s series was still a live question, one
which would later lead some mathematicians (e.g., the Italian Cesàro) to define different
sorts of summation.
9See for example the debate between Leibniz and Nieuwentijt on the existence of such higher-order
infinitesimal, as presented in (Mancosu 1996, pp. 160-164).
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It is therefore not surprising that one should come across a piece of writing such
as M.R.S.’s. M.R.S. purports to prove that the value of Grandi’s series is a
2
via an
algebraic reasoning, as opposed to Leibniz’s more “probabilistic” (per Kline) approach—
and presumably, as opposed to Grandi’s geometric approach, too. Here we quote M.R.S.’s
own exposition of his proof:
The summation of the terms of a geometric progression decreasing into the
infinite can be easily deduced from the above; in fact, if one has
x “ a` aq ` aq2 ` aq3 ` aq4 ` . . . ,
one can then write
x “ a` qpa` aq ` aq2 ` aq3 ` . . . q,
then x “ a ` qx or p1 ´ qqx “ a, hence x “ a
1´q
. As per the remarks in (5),
the equation
x “ a´ a` a´ a` a´ a` . . .
could not help in the approximation of x, as it successively gives the approx-
imate values a, 0, a, 0, a, 0, . . . among which the differences are constant; but,
without resorting to Leibniz’s subtle reasoning, one can immediately see that
this equation comes to
x “ a´ x,
hence x “ 1
2
a.10 (M.R.S. 1830, pp. 363-364)
As the text shows, M.R.S.’s treatment of Grandi’s series has the virtue of treating it
10Original French: La sommation des termes d’une prógression géométrique décroissante à l’infini se
déduit bien simplement de ce qui précède; si en effet on a
x “ a` aq ` aq2 ` aq3 ` aq4 ` . . . ,
on pourra d’abord écrire
x “ a` qpa` aq ` aq2 ` aq3 ` . . . q,
puis x “ a` qx ou p1´ qqx “ a d’où x “ a1´q .
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uniformly with other (converging) geometric series. Bolzano however is not impressed
with M.R.S.’s algebraic manipulations and sees two mistakes in them. Bolzano spells out
M.R.S.’s argument as follows. First, he sets
x “ a´ a` a´ a` a´ . . . in inf. (1)
Then, one can rewrite p1q as
a´ pa´ a` a´ a` . . . in inf.q (2)
This yields x “ a´ x and therefore x “ a
2
. Bolzano points out that while x is defined as
a ´ a ` a ´ a ` a ´ . . . in inf., the expression in (2) is not identical with it, because it
does not have the same Gliedermenge as a´ a` a´ a` a´ . . . in inf. in (1). The first a
is missing so that the correct substitution ought to be the tautological x “ a` px´ aq.
Even though Bolzano does not pause to point this out to the reader, M.R.S. is making
exactly one of those mistakes Bolzano was cautioning against in §24: he has assumed
equality of two quantities arising from summing up two series without checking that the
two series have the same Gliedermenge. Note that here again Bolzano seems to be using
Menge in a way that is closer to the meaning of “number” than to that of “set”, and
Russ’s (2004) translation accordingly translates the term as “number”. While again one
should not take the translation literally, we agree with the attempt to capture a more
quantitative use of Menge in this kind of context.
The second criticism Bolzano levels at M.R.S.’s argument is that it presupposes that
a ´ a ` a ´ a ` a . . . refers to an actual quantity, whereas Bolzano argues that it does
not. The argument Bolzano gives for this position is an example of Bolzano putting to
(mathematical) use his logico-philosophical apparatus: Grandi’s infinite sum is a spurious
one because it does not display the sum property (PU §31)
pA`Bq ` C “ A` pB ` Cq “ pA` Cq `B.
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If one tries to rewrite Grandi’s sum according to Bolzano’s equations, the left-hand side
becomes pa ´ aq ` pa ´ aq ` . . . in inf., which according to Bolzano equals 0, whereas
if one rearranges the parentheses as a ` p´a ` aq ` p´a ` aq ` p´a ` aq ` . . . in inf.,
one obtains a as a result. Thus indeed Grandi’s expression does not satisfy Bolzano’s
definition of sum. Tapp (Bolzano 2012, p. 193) notes here that Bolzano’s criterion is
quite similar to Riemann’s result (Apostol 1974, p. 197) which states that every infinite
series is absolutely convergent if and only if it is preserved under permutation (an abso-
lutely convergent series is one in which the series of the absolute values of its terms also
converges). It is unfortunate though that Bolzano’s criterion taken literally is too strong,
as it seems to be also implying that
0
N does not designate an actual quantity (see Section
3 below).
We take this section of the PU as helping our case that Bolzano’s work in §§29-33
should not be read as an imperfect set theory. Indeed, §32 is an example of Bolzano’s
principles for the computations of the infinite at work: a result published by a fellow
mathematician about the computation of infinite sums is rejected on the basis of a vi-
olation of one of these principles. However most other commentators do not devote
particular attention to §32. One notable exception is Steele, who thus summarizes §32:
“Some errors in the pretended summation of Σp´1qna, which is a symbol not expressing
any true quantity at all” (Bolzano 1950, p. 66). Even more intriguingly, he mentions
Grandi’s series and the whole controversy surrounding it when introducing the historical
context of the PU (Bolzano 1950, pp. 3-4). Yet it is as if this does not leave a trace when
giving an overall appraisal of the contributions of the PU, or of Bolzano’s contributions
to mathematics and its philosophy. Bolzano is still presented as someone who almost
anticipated Cantorian set theory, except he did not.
2.3 The sum of all squares
In the previous section, we argued that some passages of the PU offer textual evidence
for the claim that Bolzano’s work on the sizes of infinite collections should be understood
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as about sizes of infinite sums, that is, infinite series in modern terminology, rather than
as about sizes of infinite countable sets. We now make a theoretical case as per why this
interpretation is also the most charitable one.
Just following the discussion of §32, Bolzano writes that
[. . . ] if we wish to avoid getting onto the wrong track in our calculations with
the infinite then we may never allow ourselves to declare two infinitely large
quantities, which originated from the summation of the terms of two infinite
series, as equal, or one to be greater or smaller than the other, because every
term in the one is either equal to one in the other series, or greater or smaller
than it. (PU §33)
So, for two infinite sums α and β, it is not the case that, say, α ą β if for every term
of α there is one in β that is strictly smaller.
He then continues:
We may just as little declare such a sum as the greater just because it includes
all the terms of the other and in addition many, even infinitely many, terms
(which are all positive), which are absent in the other.
As an example of this principle in action, Bolzano asks us to consider the two series




1` 2` 3` 4` 5` . . . in inf. “
1
S.
According to Bolzano, “no one can deny that every term of the series of all squares”—
that is,
2
S—“because it is also a natural number, also appears in the series of first powers
of the natural numbers and likewise in the latter series
1
S, together with all the terms
of
2
S there appear many (even infinitely many) terms which are missing from
2
S because




S are such that the terms
of the latter all appear in the former, and the former also includes infinitely many terms
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S, the sum of all square numbers, is not smaller but is indis-
putably greater than
1
S, the sum of the first powers of all numbers. (PU,
§33)
Bolzano argues for this point by claiming two things: first, that “in spite of all appear-
ance to the contrary, the multitude of terms [Gliedermenge] in both series (not considered
as sums, and therefore not divisible into arbitrary multitudes of parts) is certainly the
same.” Second, that with the exclusion of the first term, all terms of
2
S are greater than
the corresponding term in
1
S. Since then the two series have the same amount of terms,
but the terms of
2
S are greater than all but one of the terms in
1
S, Bolzano concludes that
2
S is greater than
1




S and one would
still have a positive remainder as a result:




S is the same,
then it is clear that
2
S must be much greater than
1
S, since, with the exception
of the first term, each of the remaining terms in
2
S is definitely greater than
the corresponding one in
1
S. So in fact
2
S may be considered as a quantity
which contains the whole of
1
S as a part of it and even has a second part which
in itself is again an infinite series with an equal number of terms as
1
S, [. . . ]
(PU, §33)




S have the same
Gliedermenge (translated by Russ as “multitude of terms”). He is committed then to the
claim




S is the same.
This is often (see, e.g., Berg 1962, 1992; Šebest́ık 1992) interpreted as a sign that





S, namely N, the set of all natural numbers, and Np2q, the set of
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all squares, respectively. But if this is the case, then Bolzano is essentially violating
part-whole as applied to sets, the way Šebest́ık suggests (cf. Section 1).
§29 and §33 taken together raise the question of how, if at all, Bolzano envisioned to
generalize his notion of Gliedermenge from the collection of all natural numbers to any
infinite subcollection thereof—or what would be a “Bolzanian enough” way of doing this.
Let us take a step back and reconsider what Bolzano does in §29. Recall that
0
N “
10`20`30`40` . . . in inf., where each n0 is one unit, as Bolzano reminds us. Assuming
that
0
N is what Bolzano intended to be the size of N just in the same way as cardinals
are considered to capture set size in modern set theory, the question is how to extend
Bolzano’s notion of size of N to infinite (proper) subsets of N. Given the importance
that the example of squares has in Bolzano scholarship (see our Section 1), let us try to
answer the question for Np2q, specifically.
Per §29, the procedure to obtain the Menge (of terms, von Gliedern) of a series
α :“ α1, α2, α3 . . . is to first consider it as a sum
α1 ` α2 ` α3 ` . . . in inf.,
and then raise each term to the power of 0. The number of terms in α is then identified






3` . . . in inf. This means that if we list
all square numbers as sq :“ 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 36, . . . , the number of terms (hence the number
of square numbers) should be identified with
sq
N “ 10 ` 40 ` 90 ` 160 ` 250 ` 360 ` . . . in inf.
Now notice that if we apply the same procedure to the series of terms of
2
S, we obtain
exactly the same. Since
2
S as a sum is
2
S itself, i.e.,
1` 4` 9` 16` 25` 36` . . . in inf.,
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raising each term to the power of 0 yields
10 ` 40 ` 90 ` 160 ` 250 ` 360 ` . . . in inf. “
sq
N.
Thus the number of square numbers is the same as the number of terms in
2
S. But since
Bolzano endorses (Terms), the number of terms in
2
S is equal to the number of terms in
1
S, which is itself computed as 10 ` 20 ` 30 ` . . . in inf. “
0





N have the same Gliedermenge. Moreover, since any term in each
sum is regarded as a unit, both sums also have equal terms. Now by Bolzano’s remark




N . But if the first one is the number of squares and the second one is the number
of natural numbers, then under the standard (set theoretic) interpretation those two
sets have the same size, which directly contradicts the part-whole principle. So it seems
that we have reached a contradiction similar to the one highlighted by Šebest́ık (1992,
pp. 463-464).
The first reaction would be of course to bite the bullet and accept that perhaps Bolzano
did not realize that §29 and §33 would lead to a contradiction, and what is more, to a
violation of part-whole. This seems to be the line that a set theoretic interpretation forces
upon the reader. For, if
0
N , being the Gliedermenge of
1
S, is somehow also the size of N,
and the Gliedermenge of
2





S have the same Gliedermenge cannot be reconciled with part-whole as
applied to sets (PW1).
A second option would be to reject the generalization of the procedure of §29 to arrive
at
0




S. One could defend this position by
pointing out that, in §28, Bolzano only commits to be able to sometimes compute with
the infinite—not always. In particular, he does not commit to be able to determine the
size of every subset of N. We believe however that this answer is not entirely satisfactory.
For one, this solution might feel ad hoc, because even though Bolzano may have not
intended for the procedure of §29 to be applied indiscriminately to any set composed
only of natural numbers, there is nothing intrinsic to the procedure itself that bars such
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a generalization from being carried out. Moreover, while §29 does not explicitly mention
a general procedure for determining the Gliedermenge of an infinite sum, determining
when two sums have the same Gliedermenge is necessary to determine whether one is
greater than another, as Bolzano himself notes (see §§24 and 32). Since Gliedermengen
are Mengen, multitudes, it is natural to ask whether part-whole reasoning applies to, or
is even compatible with, the procedure of determining when the Gliedermengen of two
sums are equal. In a way, then, this second option does not solve the theoretical problem
raised by Bolzano’s work so much as skirt around it via a “monster-barring” move.
There is a third option though, which hinges upon a closer reading of §29. Indeed,
when computing quantities of the form
n
N , which for him corresponds to the number
of natural numbers greater than n, Bolzano does seem to apply the procedure sketched
above, namely writing down the sum pn`1q`pn`2q`pn`3q`. . . in inf., and then raising
each term to the 0th power, thus obtaining the sum pn`1q0`pn`2q0`pn`3q0`. . . in inf..





N should be computed as:
p10 ´ pn` 1q0q ` p20 ´ pn` 2q0q ` . . . in inf.









N “ 10 ` 20 ` . . .` n0,




N is equal to the infinite sum
p10q ` p20q ` . . .` pn0q ` ppn` 1q0 ´ pn` 1q0q ` ppn` 2q0 ´ pn` 2q0q ` . . . in inf.
But this in turn suggests that a more accurate way of representing
n








N is not obtained by listing all the numbers above n in an infinite sum
and raising each of them to the power of 0, but is instead obtained by erasing the first n
terms from the sum corresponding to
0
N . This procedure clearly changes the number of




N , we must therefore make sure
first that the two sums have the same Gliedermenge, which implies adding n terms to
n
N
which act, quite literally, as the “ghosts of departed quantities”.
This reading of Bolzano’s text now gives a way out of the problem of the sum of
all squares presented above. Let us consider again the example of Np2q. If we want to
compute its size as a subset of N, the way to obtain said size is first to compute that of
N, namely,
0
N . We then remove from
0
N the elements whose base is not an element of
Np2q, thus obtaining
SQ





N is that, in the former, 40 is the second term of the
sum, while it is the fourth term in
SQ
N—and so on. The idea would be then that such
an erasure procedure does change the number of elements from one set to the other,
because Np2q considered as a subset of N has a different size from when considered as the
set underlying the sum
2




N is not available




N are sets, i.e. entirely determined by
their elements, then as the two sums clearly have the same terms, they should also be
equal to one another. By contrast, the difference between the two sums is easy to express
in our interpretation of Bolzano’s computations (see next section), because
sq
N would
correspond to a countable sequence with graph tx1, 10y, x2, 40y, x3, 90y, . . . u whereas
SQ
N
has graph tx1, 10y, x2, 0y, x3, 0y, x4, 40y, . . . u. Incidentally, Tapp (Bolzano 2012, p. 191)
suggests a similar idea for the interpretation of §29, raising the question whether such an
interpretation can actually lead to a fully-fledged coherent reading of the PU. Our next
two sections address that question.
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3 An ultrapower construction modelling Bolzano’s
arithmetic of the infinite
Our goal in this section is to offer a model of Bolzano’s computations with infinite sums.
More precisely, we interpret Bolzano’s talk of infinite sums and operations between them
as statements about a certain model and show that all of Bolzano’s positive results as
summarized in the previous section also hold in our model. Additionally, we argue that
our model accurately represents Bolzano’s reasoning, in that several of the proofs we
provide closely match Bolzano’s own arguments in the PU.
Our main idea is to associate to each infinite sum a corresponding infinite quantity.
Our proposal here is closely related to the theory of numerosities (Benci and Di Nasso
2003; more recently Benci and Nasso 2019, Ch. 17), in which the numerosity of a set of
natural numbers is defined as an element in an ultrapower of N. However, since our focus
is on assigning infinite quantities to certain infinite sums of integers, and not on assigning
numerosities to sets of natural numbers, our proposal will be slightly different. Part of
our model is in fact closer to the construction presented by Trlifajová (2018, pp. 20-24),
which we will discuss in Section 3.4. In order to do that, we first need to outline our own
proposal.
3.1 The basic framework
We start by representing Bolzano’s infinite sums of integers as countable sequences of
integers. Formally, we write ω` for the set of positive natural numbers and Z for
the set of all integers, and we consider functions from ω` Ñ Z. To any infinite sum
a1 ` a2 ` a3 ` . . . in inf., we associate the function f : i ÞÑ ai, i.e., the function that
maps each positive natural number i to the ith summand of the infinite sum. As is cus-
tomary, we will often identify a function f : ω` Ñ Z with the countable sequence of
integers pfp1q, fp2q, fp3q, . . . q. In the case of a Bolzanian sum α which has a different
Gliedermenge because it has been obtained from another sum by erasing certain terms,
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we treat the erased terms as 0 and obtain the function associated to α accordingly. For
example, since the sequence associated to
0
N is p1, 1, 1, . . . q, the sequence associated to
2
N is p0, 0, 1, 1, . . . q.
We consider the structure Z :“ pZ,`,´, 0, 1,ăq of integers with their usual ordering
and addition operation, and take an ultrapower ZU of this structure by a non-principal
ultrafilter on ω` (i.e., a non-empty collection U of infinite subsets of ω` closed under
supersets and finite intersections and such that for any A Ď ω`, precisely one of A, ω`zA
belongs to U ). Ultrapowers are standard constructions in mathematical logic, and a
detailed presentation of their theory is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we
refer the reader to Bell and Slomson (1974, Chs. 5, 6) for a standard introduction to
ultrapowers and ultraproducts, and simply list some crucial facts below:
Lemma 3.1.
1. Elements in the ultrapower ZU are equivalence classes of functions from ω` to Z.
For any f : ω` Ñ Z, we write its corresponding equivalence class as f˚. For any
f, g : ω` Ñ Z, g˚ “ f˚ if and only if f and g are equal for U -many elements in
ω`, i.e., ti P ω` : fpiq “ gpiqu P U .
2. There is a canonical elementary embedding of Z into ZU , obtained by mapping any
integer z to the equivalence class of the constant function ez : ω
` Ñ Z sending any
i P ω` to z. It is customary to identify z with e˚z and to view Z as an elementary
substructure of ZU .
3. Addition and subtraction are defined in ZU . Given f, g : ω` Ñ Z, f˚ ` g˚ is the
equivalence class of the function h : ω` Ñ Z such that hpiq “ fpiq ` gpiq for any
i P ω`. Similarly, f˚ ´ g˚ is the equivalence class of the function h : ω` Ñ Z such
that hpiq “ fpiq ´ gpiq for any i P ω`.
4. Elements in ZU are linearly ordered. More precisely, given any f, g : ω` Ñ Z, we
have that ZU |ù f ă g if and only if ti P ω` : Z |ù fpiq ă gpiqu P U .
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5. Given any first-order formula φpx1, . . . , xnq and any functions f1, . . . , fn : ω
` Ñ Z,
we write ||φpf˚1 , . . . , f
˚
n q|| for the set ti P ω
` : Z |ù φpf1piq, . . . , fnpiqqu.  Loś’s
Theorem states that for any φpx1, . . . , xnq and any functions f1, . . . , fn,
ZU |ù φpf˚1 , . . . , f˚n q iff ||φpf˚1 , . . . , f˚n q|| P U .
6. As a direct consequence of  Loś’s Theorem, Z and ZU are elementarily equivalent.
An intuitive motivation for our use of an ultrapower of Z can be provided along the
following lines. As we have argued, we take Bolzanian infinite quantities to be infinite
sums. Given an infinite sum α, we may decompose α into a sequence of partial sums
tαnunPω` , where, for any positive integer n, αn is the sum of the first n terms in α. Any
such sum can be seen as providing some partial information about α, and if α were a
finite sum with n terms, then αn would be α itself. However, since α is infinite, there is
no last term of α and no partial sum that would give us total information about α. In
order to overcome this difficulty, we must try to organize the partial information given
by each partial sum of the first n terms of α into a coherent whole. This is precisely the
role that a non-principal ultrafilter U on ω` will play for us. One may think of U as a
collection of properties of positive integers that describe a natural number “at infinity”,
distinct from all finite numbers, and providing a vantage point from which all the partial
sums of α form a coherent picture. We therefore encourage the reader who may not be
familiar with ultrapowers to keep the following two principles in mind:
• Properties of an infinite sum α are those that are shared by “most” partial sums of
the form αn;
• What “most” partial sums means is determined by U . Given a set of positive
integers A, the set tαn : n P Au contains “most” partial sums of α if and only if
A P U .
Given a function f : ω` Ñ Z, we define the approximating sequence of f to be the
function σpfq : ω` Ñ Z defined by σpfqpiq “
ři
j“1 fpjq for any i P ω
`. In the case of
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a function f representing a Bolzanian sum α, the approximating sequence of f is sim-
ply the sequence of partial sums pα1, α2, . . . q mentioned above. Our proposal consists in
identifying the (possibly infinite) quantity designated by a Bolzanian sum f with σpfq˚,
i.e., with the equivalence class of its approximating sequence. To simplify notation, we
will write f for the element σpfq˚ in ZU , but we will sometimes abuse notation and write
fpiq for σpfqpiq.
We are now able to represent all infinite sums and infinite quantities discussed by
Bolzano, except products of infinite quantities, which we will discuss in Section 4. As
outlined above, the procedure consists in turning a Bolzanian infinite sum into a count-
able sequence of integers, to which (the equivalence class of) an approximating sequence
is then associated. Additions and order relations between infinite sums are then deter-
mined by the ultrapower. As an example, the infinite sum 10 ` 20 ` 30 ` . . . in inf. is
represented by the sequence
0
N :“ p1, 1, 1, . . . q, since, according to Bolzano, each sum-





Nq “ p1, 2, 3, . . . q, which corresponds to the identity function on ω`, and
0
N
is the equivalence class of the sequence p1, 2, 3, . . . q. Similarly, infinite sums of the form
pn ` 1q0 ` pn ` 2q0 ` . . . in inf., which Bolzano writes as
n
N , are sums that according
to him have n fewer terms than
0
N . We therefore propose to model
n
N as a countable
sequence in which the first n summands are 0, i.e., by the sequence p0, . . . , 0
loomoon
n times
, 1, 1, . . . q.
The corresponding approximating sequence σp
n
Nq is p0, . . . , 0
loomoon
n times
, 1, 2, . . . q. Equivalently, for
any i P ω`, σp
n
Nqpiq “ i ´ n, where i ´ n “ 0 if i ď n and i´ n otherwise.




S, as well as Grandi’s









S, and Ga in the table below:
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Bolzanian Infinite Sum Sequence Representation approximating sequence Corresponding Function Infinite Quantity
10 ` 20 ` . . . in inf.
0
N “ p1, 1, 1, 1, . . . q σp
0







pn` 1q0 ` pn` 2q0 ` . . . in inf.
n
N “ p0, . . . , 0
loomoon
n times
, 1, 1, . . . q σp
n
Nq “ p0, . . . , 0
loomoon
n times
, 1, 2, 3, . . . q σp
n





1` 2` 3` . . . in inf.
1
S “ p1, 2, 3, 4, . . . q σp
1









1n ` 2n ` 3n . . . in inf.
n
S “ p1n, 2n, 3n, 4n, . . . q σp
n










a´ a` a´ a` . . . in inf. Ga “ pa,´a, a,´a, . . . q σpGaq “ pa, 0, a, 0, . . . q σpGaqpiq “
#
a if i is even
0 if i is odd
Ga “ σpGaq
˚
Table 1: Representation of Bolzanian sums in ZU
3.2 Modelling Bolzano’s results about infinite sums
We now establish some results that echo Bolzano’s own computations. We will first give
proofs in our framework, then argue that those proofs are very close in spirit to Bolzano’s






1. For any natural numbers i, n, ZU |ù i ă
n
N.















The first result asserts that all sums of the form
n
N are infinite, in the sense that
they are greater than any finite number. The second shows that our model preserves
Bolzano’s part-whole intuition that certain infinite sums might have fewer terms than
some others and that, as a consequence, two infinite quantities might differ by a finite
quantity. Finally, the last two correspond to Bolzano’s claim that some infinite quantities
might be infinitely greater than some others. Note that we write nα as a shorthand for
the sum of α with itself n times, which is defined in the ultrapower.
The proofs for all four items are all similar and can be thought of as “arguments by
cofiniteness”. In all cases, we show that ZU satisfies a formula φ by showing that ||φ||
is a cofinite subset of ω` and must therefore belong to U (since U is non-principal, it
contains no finite set, so it must contain all cofinite sets).
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Proof.
1. Recall that, in ZU , the natural number i corresponds to (the equivalence class of)
the function ei : m ÞÑ i. Moreover, for any natural number n,
n
Npiq “ i ´ n. Thus
||i ă
n
N|| “ tj P ω` : i ă j ´ nu “ tj P ω` : i` n ă ju. Hence ||i ă
n
N|| is a cofinite
subset of ω` and belongs to U , from which it follows that ZU |ù i ă
n
N.









Npiq “ i´ pi ´ nq























, we have that i
0


















ku “ tj P ω` : iˆj ă
jpj ` 1q
2













4. The argument is a simple generalization of the one above. Fix some natural numbers






















n`1 ´ ijnq for any k P ω`.
Now since pjn`1´ ijnq is positive for any j ą i and in fact assumes arbitrarily large









S ą 0|| is a cofinite subset of ω`. Now since Z |ù @x@ypx´y ą 0 Ñ y ă xq, by













for any natural numbers i and n.11
11A more direct proof of this result can also be given using more advanced resources from number
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Let us now compare the proofs above with Bolzano’s arguments in sections 29 and 33
of PU. Bolzano does not explicitly argue for results p1q and p3q: in §29, he seems to take




N designate infinite quantities, and he simply
writes that
1
S is “far greater than
0
N”. However, the same section contains the following
argument for p2q:
If we designate [the number of all natural numbers] by
0
N and therefore form
the merely symbolic equation
10 ` 20 ` 30 ` . . .` n0 ` pn` 1q0 ` . . . in inf. “
0
N (1)
and in the same way we designate the number of natural numbers from pn`1q
n
N , and therefore form the equation
pn` 1q0 ` pn` 2q0 ` pn` 3q0 ` . . . in inf. “
n
N, (2)
then we obtain by subtraction the certain and quite unobjectionable equation










have a completely definite finite difference.














N after this procedure are the first n sum-
mands in
0




N “ n. In our setting,
0
N is represented
theory. It is a standard number-theoretic fact (using for example Faulhaber’s formula) that for any
natural numbers k, n,
řk
j“1 j




Spkq is a polynomial in k of degree n ` 1 with leading term in`1k
n`1, while
n`1
S pkq is a polynomial in
k of degree n ` 2 with leading term 1n`2k









S || is a cofinite subset of ω`.
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by (the equivalence class of) the sequence p1, 2, 3, . . . q, while
n
N is represented by the
sequence p0, . . . , 0
loomoon
n times








N componentwise, i.e., the sequence p1, 2, 3 . . . , n, n, n, . . . q, which over U is equivalent





N is determined by the difference between matching summands (i.e., the difference
is computed componentwise) and is precisely n.
Finally, Bolzano does not explicitly argue for p4q in its full generality. In a very
revealing passage in §33, however, he gives a detailed argument for the n “ 1 instance of
p4q when arguing that
2
S is infinitely greater than
1
S:




S is the same,
then it is clear that
2
S must be much greater than
1
S, since, with the exception
of the first term, each of the remaining terms in
2
S is definitely greater than
the corresponding one in
1
S. So in fact
2
S may be considered as a quantity
which contains the whole of
1
S as a part of it and even has a second part which




0, 2, 6, 12, 20, 30, 42, 56, . . . , npn´ 1q, . . . in inf.,
in which, with the exception of the first two terms, all succeeding terms are
greater than the corresponding terms in
1
S, so that the sum of the whole
series is again indisputably greater than
1
S. If we therefore subtract from
this remainder the series
1
S for the second time, then we obtain as the second
remainder a series of the same number of terms [Gliedermenge]
´1, 0, 3, 8, 15, 24, 35, 48, . . . , npn´ 2q, . . . in inf.
in which, with the exception of the first three terms all the following terms are
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greater than the corresponding ones in
1
S, so that also this third remainder
is without contradiction greater than
1
S. Now since these arguments can be
continued without end it is clear that the sum
2
S is infinitely greater than the
sum
1




S “ p1´mq`p22´2mq`p32´3mq`p42´4mq`. . .`pm2´m2q`. . .`npn´mq`. . . in inf.
In this series only a finite multitude of terms [Menge von Gliedern], namely
the first m ´ 1 are negative and the mth is 0, but all succeeding ones are
positive and increase indefinitely.
Let us note two features of Bolzano’s argument that are shared by our interpretation.
First, when determining whether one infinite sum is greater than another one, Bolzano
considers which terms in the first sum are greater than the corresponding terms in the
second one: this is reminiscent of the way relations between (equivalence classes of)
functions are determined in an ultrapower. Moreover, Bolzano’s reason to claim that
2






S, and so on, is that in all such cases, all but finitely many
terms in
2
S are strictly greater than the corresponding terms in any finite multiple of
1
S.
This seems very similar to the “argument by cofiniteness” that we presented above: even
though the first terms of the sum m
1
S might be greater than the first terms of the sum
2
S,
the terms in the second sum become greater than the corresponding terms in the first one








Spiq ą 0 for cofinitely many natural numbers i. To establish this, it is enough to
observe, like Bolzano, that i2´mi is positive for any i ą m, as this implies that the sum
ři
j“1pj
2´mjq must be positive for i large enough. It is worth mentioning that, unlike in









S are the approximating sequences
of the sequences p1, 2, 3, . . . q and p1, 4, 9, . . . q respectively, while Bolzano is reasoning with
the sequences of terms themselves. We therefore conclude that the general proof given
for 4 closely matches Bolzano’s own reasoning. In particular, our use of an ultrapower
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construction enables us to lift the following criterion for the inequality of two integers:
@m,npm ă nØ n´m ą 0q (1)
to a criterion for the inequality of two infinite sums:
@α,βpα ă β Ø ti P ω` : pβ ´αqpiq ą 0u P U q. (2)
In other words, in our formalism, in order to determine whether an infinite sum α
is greater than another infinite sum β, it is enough to compute their difference β ´ α,
which is defined termwise, and then determine whether the sum of the first i terms of
β ´α is positive for U -many i. Our claim is that this reasoning is very close to the one










are positive, Bolzano can be seen as implicitly displaying a form of part-whole reasoning
about sums, rather than sets: m
1
S is smaller than
2
S because it is contained “as a part”.




S is positive, and this latter





positive. Thus Bolzano can be read here as providing a criterion for when the quantity
designated by a sum α is a proper part of the quantity designated by another sum β. We
will come back to this point in Section 5, and we will discuss its implication for the role
that part-whole reasoning plays in Bolzano’s computations with the infinitely large.
3.3 Grandi’s series
Finally, let us address some of Bolzano’s remarks on Grandi’s series. As noted above,
Bolzano disagrees with the claim (attributed to M.R.S.) that the infinite sum
x “ a´ a` a´ a` . . . in inf.
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designates the quantity a
2
. In particular, Bolzano claims that the mistake in M.R.S.’s
proof is to treat the sum obtained by discarding the first term of x as ´x. In our setting,
x designates the quantity Ga, i.e., the equivalence class of the sequence pa, 0, a, 0, . . . q.
On the other hand, following the strategy adopted for “truncated” infinite sums like
n
N, it seems that the infinite sum obtained by discarding the first term in x should be
interpreted as the countable sequence p0,´a, a,´a, a, . . . q. If we write this sequence as
1
Ga, we then have that
1
Ga is the equivalence class of the sequence p0,´a, 0,´a, . . . q. But
then, it follows that
ZU |ù Ga ´
1
Ga “ a.
Indeed, for any i P ω`, Gapiq “ a if i is even and 0 if i is odd, while
1
Gapiq “ 0 if i is even
and ´a if i is odd. Thus Gapiq ´
1
Gapiq “ a for any i. Hence our interpretation agrees
with Bolzano’s diagnostic of the fallacy in M.R.S.’s proof:
The series in the brackets obviously does not have the same multitude of
terms [Gliedermenge] as the one put “ x at first, rather it is lacking the first
a. Therefore its value, supposing it could actually be stated, would have to
be denoted by x´ a. But this would have given the identical equation
x “ a` x´ a.
Moreover, recall that Bolzano raises a second, deeper argument against M.R.S.’s con-
clusion: the infinite sum x cannot designate an “actual quantity”, since different ways of
parsing this infinite sum yield different conclusions regarding which quantity it allegedly
designates. According to Bolzano, the infinite sum
a´ a` a´ a` . . . in inf.
represents the same quantity as the sums
pa´ aq ` pa´ aq ` pa´ aq ` . . . in inf.
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and
a` p´a` aq ` p´a` aq ` p´a` aq ` . . . in inf.
But the first expression simplifies as
0` 0` 0` . . . in inf.,
while the second one simplifies as
a` 0` 0` 0` . . . in inf..
Therefore, if it were a real quantity, x should be equal to both 0 and a, which is a con-
tradiction.
What does this argument become in our interpretation? At first sight, it seems that
we cannot make sense of Bolzano’s claim that Grandi’s series does not represent any
actual quantity, since we attributed to this series the element Ga in ZU . However,
it is straightforward to verify that, depending on which subsets of ω` are in U , Ga
is computed differently in the ultrapower. Indeed, since Ga is the (equivalence class
of) the sequence pa, 0, a, 0, . . . q, we have that ||Ga “ a|| “ t2i ´ 1 : i P ω
`u, while
||Ga “ 0|| “ t2i : i P ω
`u. Now since U is an ultrafilter, exactly one of ||Ga “ a||
or ||Ga “ 0|| belongs to U . This implies that ZU |ù Ga “ a _ Ga “ 0 regardless
of our choice of ultrafilter, but the choice of U determines whether ZU |ù Ga “ a or
ZU |ù Ga “ 0. Thus we seem to recover at last part of Bolzano’s intuition that the
quantity designated by the sum a´ a` a´ a` . . . in inf. is indeterminate, as it can be
computed to be equal to 0 or to a.
Bolzano also argues that the sum a´a`a´a` . . . in inf. should represent the same
quantity as the sum
´a` pa´ aq ` pa´ aq ` . . . in inf.,
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which simplifies to
´a` 0` 0` . . . in inf.,
and should therefore designate the quantity ´a. His argument is that one may first
compute Grandi’s series as
pa´ aq ` pa´ aq ` . . . in inf.
Using commutativity of addition an infinite number of times, swap each pair of terms in
order to obtain the series
p´a` aq ` p´a` aq ` . . . in inf.,
which, by associativity is then equivalent to
´a` pa´ aq ` pa´ aq ` . . . in inf.
In our setting, the infinite sum ´a ` a ´ a ` a ´ . . . in inf. is represented by its ap-
proximating sequence p´a, 0,´a, 0, . . . q. As a consequence, the infinite sums a ´ a `
a ´ a ` . . . in inf. and ´a ` a ´ a ` a ´ . . . in inf. will be identified in ZU precisely if
t2i : i P ω`u P U . In fact, as shown above, in such a case both series will be identified
with 0.
In light of the remarks above, it might be tempting to conclude that Bolzano’s criterion
for an infinite sum to represent an actual quantity, namely that the order in which the
terms are summed do not change the result of the summation, could be interpreted in
our framework as some kind of absoluteness of the corresponding sequences under the
choice of a non-principal ultrafilter U . However, it is straightforward to observe that
Bolzano’s own criterion is too strong for his purposes. Indeed, let us consider again the
infinite sum
0
N “ 10 ` 20 ` 30 ` . . . in inf. If we interpret, as we have done so far, n0 as
equal to 1 for any natural number n, then this infinite sum may actually be written as
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p1` 1q ` p1` 1q ` p1` 1q ` . . . in inf. “ 2` 2` 2 . . . in inf.















N does not designate any infinite quantity after all, since it is equal to 0. This
means that the order in which the terms in
0
N are summed determine which quantity the
sum designates, which, by Bolzano’s own criterion, is impossible. Of course, a Bolzanian
could reply to that argument that there is a fallacy in deriving this equality, because the
sum between parenthesis on the second line above does not have the same Gliedermenge
as the original 1 ` 1 ` 1 ` . . . in inf. Note that this response implies that changing the
order in which terms are summed together, although it does not change the quantity
designated by the sum, does change its Gliedermenge. Moreover, this answer is not
entirely satisfactory. Indeed, if we assume that the right-hand side of the first equation
above does not have the same Gliedermenge as
0
N , we may therefore represent the two
sums p1`1q`p1`1q`p1`1q`. . . in inf. and 1`p1`1q`p1`1q`. . . in inf. by the sequences
A1 :“ p0, 2, 0, 2, 0, 2, . . . q and A2 :“ p1, 0, 2, 0, 2, 0, . . . q respectively. Since both sums
correspond to different ways of writing
0
N , we should expect thatA1 “ A2 “
0
N. However,
one quickly notices that σpA1qpiq ă σpA2qpiq whenever i is odd, and σpA2qpiq ă σpA1qpiq
whenever i is even. But this immediately implies that ZU |ù A1 ‰ A2. In other
words, if we interpret the two infinite sums p1 ` 1q ` p1 ` 1q ` p1 ` 1q ` . . . in inf.
and 1 ` p1 ` 1q ` p1 ` 1q ` . . . in inf. by A1 and A2, then in order to satisfy Bolzano’s
requirement that infinite associativity holds, we would need both the set of even numbers
and the set of odd numbers to be in U , which is not possible. Note however that this
has little to do with our formalization: Bolzano himself seems committed to the following
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equalities:
p1` 1q ` p1` 1q ` p1` 1q ` . . . in inf. “
0
N “ 1` p1` 1q ` p1` 1q ` . . . in inf.
2` 2` 2` . . . in inf. “ 1` 2` 2` . . . in inf.,
but there does not seem to be any reasonable way of establishing directly the latter
equality. However, let us conclude this section by noting that a weaker requirement
could be imposed on infinite sums which designate actual quantities, namely that any
finite permutation of the terms or of the order in which such terms are summed does
not change the value of the sum. However, it is straightforward to verify that all sums
in our formalization satisfy this criterion: any two infinite sums that differ from one
another only by a finite permutation of their terms or by finitely many rearrangements of
the order in which those terms are summed are represented by approximating sequences
which agree on a cofinite set and are therefore identified in ZU . Thus this alternative
criterion is too weak to rule out Grandi’s series. In short, while Bolzano’s first argument
against M.R.S can easily be translated in our framework, his second argument seems to
prove either too much, or too little, for his purposes.
3.4 Comparisons with related work
Our central proposal is to model Bolzano’s computations inside an ultrapower of the
integers, and to identify the quantities designated by Bolzanian infinite sums with equiv-
alence classes of functions from the positive integers to the integers. This idea is very close
to a proposal made by Trlifajová (2018), although there are a few important differences
that we must remark on. First, Trlifajová seems to be primarily interested in connecting
Bolzano’s ideas with some modern approaches to non-standard analysis, while we are
more interested in a close reading of Bolzano’s arguments and in establishing the consis-
tency of our interpretation. Second, Trlifajová works mainly with equivalence classes of
functions from ω to the real numbers. By contrast, we work with countable sequences of
integers. Indeed, we believe that determining whether Bolzano’s notion of a real number
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corresponds to our modern notion is a difficult problem. Bolzano, of course, made some
significant contributions to the foundations of analysis. In particular, he developed a the-
ory of measurable numbers (Bolzano 1976, Part VII) which is often seen as an attempt to
define the real numbers (see e.g. Rootselaar 1964; Spalt 1991; Russ and Trlifajová 2016).
Trying to model Bolzano’s computations with real numbers would require us to provide
a detailed discussion of Bolzano’s theory of measurable numbers. Since we are primarily
interested in challenging the received view according to which Bolzano’s computations
should be read as a flawed attempt to develop an arithmetic of the transfinite, we believe
that addressing this issue would take us too far astray. Just as Bolzano’s measurable
numbers are beyond the scope of our goals for this paper, so are Bolzano’s arguments in
PU involving infinitely small quantities or infinitesimal calculus. Third, let us note that,
in Trlifajová’s framework, two sequences are identified if they agree on a cofinite set of
natural numbers. Formally, this means that she works with a reduced power of R rather
than an ultrapower. While we do see the appeal of using only the Fréchet filter on the
natural numbers instead of a non-principal ultrafilter, we have several reasons to believe
that our framework is more suitable to our purposes.
For one, only a weaker version of  Loś’s theorem holds for reduced powers (see Hodges
1993, p. 445), which means that the resulting structure will not be as well-behaved as
the ultrapower construction we are using. While this does not create significant tech-
nical issues at this stage, we will argue in the next section that the most accurate way
of modelling Bolzano’s views on the product of infinite sums is to conceive of it as an
interated infinite summation. This means that one will have to work with either iter-
ated ultrapowers, or iterated reduced powers, the general theory of which is much less
developed.
Moreover, we believe that the use of a non-principal ultrafilter rather than the Fréchet
filter can also be justified on interpretive grounds. Indeed, it is straightforward to ver-
ify that the reduced power ZF , in which two sequences α and β are identified only
if ||α “ β|| is cofinite, does not satisfy trichotomy. For example, for the sequence
α “ p1, 0, 1, 0, . . . q, we have that none of ||α “ 0||, ||α ă 0|| or ||0 ă α|| is a cofinite
49
set, and thus ZF |ù  pα ă 0q ^  pα ą 0q ^  pα “ 0q. One might argue that this is a
desirable feature of a formal reconstruction of Bolzano’s ideas about the infinite, since,
in §28, Bolzano writes that “a determination of the relationship of one infinity to one
another [. . . ] is feasible, in certain cases at any rate . . . ”. Nonetheless, we think that
Bolzano should not be read in this passage as claiming that trichotomy may not hold in
the case of infinite quantities. Indeed, as mentioned in Section 1.1, it is part of Bolzano’s
very definition of a quantity that it must obey the law of trichotomy. All things con-
sidered, then, we believe that a formalisation that preserves trichotomy–such as ours,
using ultrapowers–is more faithful to the text than a formalization that preempts the
very possibility of trichotomy for infinite quantities, such as one using the Fréchet filter.
A second related work is the recently proposed theory of numerosities (Benci and
Di Nasso 2003), which we have already mentioned in the introduction to this paper.
Numerosities form a positive semi-ring that is meant to capture an intuitive notion of
the size of sets of natural numbers. Benci and di Nasso introduce the technical notion of
a labelled set of natural numbers, i.e., a set A Ď N with an associated labelling function
`A : AÑ N which is finite-to-one and represents a certain way of counting the elements of
the set. One can then define the sum and product of two labelled sets in a natural way.
Labelling functions allow for the representation of (disjoint unions and finite products
of) subsets of N as approximating sequences, which are non-decreasing functions from
N Ñ N. The numerosity of a set A can then be defined as the equivalence class of its
approximating sequence in an ultrapower NU of N by a Ramsey ultrafilter U . Benci
and di Nasso show that the requirement that U be Ramsey guarantees that any element
of NU is the numerosity of some subset of N. They also show that for any A,B Ď N,
if A Ĺ B then NU |ù numpAq ă numpBq, and that the numerosity of a disjoint sum
(respectively, product) of two labelled sets is equal to the sum (respectively, product) of
the numerosities of the labelled sets as computed by the ultrapower.
Numerosities share some features with our interpretation of Bolzano’s computations,
in particular regarding the way sums of infinite quantities are defined. However, a central
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motivation for the numerosity framework is to develop a theory of the size of sets of natural
numbers that is consistent with what we called the set-theoretic part-whole principle
PW1. As we will argue in Section 5, we take Bolzano’s arithmetic of the infinite to be
compatible with the set-theoretic part-whole principle but not motivated by it, as we do
not believe that Bolzano is primarily concerned with counting sets of natural numbers
but rather with developing a theory of infinite sums.
4 Higher-order infinities
4.1 The product of two infinite quantities





S, as well as Grandi’s series. We have, however, refrained from giving
an interpretation of Bolzano’s computations involving products of two infinite quantities.
Although our treatment of Bolzano’s computations so far closely matches Trlifajová’s and
is consistent with numerosities, our account of Bolzanian products of infinite quantities
will be quite different. Indeed, it seems at first sight that there is a natural way to define
the product of two quantities in ZU . Similarly to the way addition is defined, we could de-
fine the product componentwise. Formally, for any f, g : ω` Ñ Z, letting f ¨ g : ω` Ñ Z
be the function mapping any i P ω` to fpiq ˆ gpiq, we may define f˚ ¨ g˚ as pf ¨ gq˚.
This is the definition adopted by Benci and Di Nasso (2003) and Trlifajová (2018), and
it is straightforward to check that, under this definition, the structure pZU ,`, ¨, 0, 1,ăq
is an ordered commutative ring. However, we believe that this definition of the prod-
uct does not satisfactorily account for Bolzano’s ideas as exposed in PU. We will first
lay out our textual evidence for this claim and then explain how our interpretation works.
Bolzano gives explicit computations of the product of two infinite quantities in only
one passage towards the end of §29:
The purely symbolic equation [(1)]12 underlying all this will surely allow the
12The German version of the text reads (4) here, but the context clearly suggests that this is a mistake.
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derivation, through successive multiplication of both sides by
0























` . . . in inf. “ p
0
Nq3 etc.
from which we are convinced that there [are] also infinite quantities of so-
called higher orders, of which one exceeds the other infinitely many times.
But it also certainly follows from this [that] there are infinite quantities which
have every arbitrary rational, as well as irrational, ratio α : β to one another,
because, as long as
0





N are likewise a pair of infinite quantities which are in
the ratio α : β.
Bolzano defines the product of the quantity
0
N with itself, noted p
0












N ` . . . in inf. “ p
0
Nq2
is obtained from the equation





N on both sides. This seems to suggest that Bolzano assumes some
form of distributivity of multiplication over infinite summation, which allows him to








N . . . in inf. on the left-hand
side of the equality symbol. Understood as such, p
0
Nq2 is an infinite sum in which all terms
are infinite quantities. Quantities of the form p
0
Nqn are the only example in Bolzano’s
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text of quantities defined explicitly as infinite sums of infinite quantities. It is also worth
mentioning that, even though Bolzano discusses other examples of infinite quantities be-
ing infinitely smaller or larger than one another, this is the only case in §§29-33 where
some infinite quantities are explicitly referred to as being “of higher order” than some
others.13
If we were to interpret p
0
Nq2 in a similar fashion as Trlifajová and Benci and Di Nasso,
we would have to define the quantity p
0






Npiq “ i2 for
all i P ω`. However, due to the well-known fact that the sum of the first n odd numbers
is always equal to n2, the infinite sum
Odds
S :“ 1` 3` 5` 7 . . . in inf. is also represented












N ` . . . in inf. actually designate the same quantity. But this seems a clear
violation of Bolzano’s treatment of order relationships between infinite sums. Indeed,
we saw above that, in showing that
2
S was infinitely greater than
1
S, Bolzano reached
his conclusion by showing that the difference between matching summands in
2
S and in
any finite multiple of
1





Nq2 have the same number of terms, we could also argue along











N´5iq` . . . in inf., in which all summands are positive (and in
fact infinite). As we have argued in Section 3.2, one can extract from Bolzano’s writings
13The authors thank an anonymous referee for noting that an alternative interpretation of §29 is also




Nq3, Bolzano writes that this “convinc[es us] that there are also
infinite quantities of so-called higher orders, of which one exceeds the other infinitely many times.” This
can be read as meaning that whenever an infinite quantity A exceeds an infinite quantity B infinitely
many times, then A is an infinite of higher order with respect to B. In other words, the definition of
infinities of higher order is infinities that exceed smaller infinities by an infinitely large factor. This
understanding of “higher order” is problematic, however, for at least two reasons. First, if “of higher
order” simply meant “infinitely larger or smaller”, then the introduction of
1
S in §29 should have sufficed
to establish the existence of infinite quantities of higher-order, since Bolzano has already noted by that
point that
1
S is “far greater than”
0
N . Second, in the definition of “infinite” (§10), Bolzano presents
the concept of infinitely smaller and infinitely greater quantities of higher order as quantities derived
from, but not identical with, infinitely small and infinitely large quantities. The referee’s interpretation,
by contrast, would collapse the notion of infinities of higher order into that of infinities simpliciter, per
Bolzano’s definition.
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a sufficient criterion for one sum α to be strictly greater than another sum β, namely
when all but finitely many terms in the sum α ´ β are positive. We will come back to
this issue at greater length in Section 5. For now, let us note that, if our interpretation is
correct, we must conclude in the present case that p
0
Nq2 is greater than any finite multiple
of
Odds




S . The componentwise definition of the product of two
quantities is therefore incompatible with Bolzano’s own criterion for comparing infinite
sums.
Moreover, another passage from §29 seems to explicitly contradict the “component-
wise” interpretation of the product of two infinite quantities. Indeed, when introducing
the sum of all natural numbers
1
S, Bolzano writes:
On the other hand if we designate the quantity which represents the sum of
all natural numbers by [
1
S], or assert the merely symbolic equation
1` 2` 3` . . .` n` pn` 1q ` . . . in inf. “ r
1
Ss (4)
then we will certainly realize that [
1
S] must be far greater than
0
N . But it is
not so easy to determine precisely the difference between these two infinite
quantities or even their (geometrical) ratio to one another. For if, as some









then we could hardly justify it on any other ground than that for every finite
multitude of terms [Menge von Gliedern] the equation
1` 2` 3` . . .` n “
n.pn` 1q
2
holds, from which it appears to follow that for the complete infinite multitude
of numbers n just becomes
0
N . However it is in fact not so, because with an
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infinite series it is absurd to speak of a last term which has the value
0
N .
Bolzano’s point here seems to be that one cannot infer from the validity of Gauss’s
summation theorem for finite numbers that an “infinitary” version of the summation
theorem also holds for infinite quantities. His rejection of the infinite summation theorem
can be given two readings, one stronger, and one weaker. On the stronger reading,
Bolzano is arguing that the infinite summation theorem is false, because the only way of
justifying it, namely, through an inference from the finite to the infinite, leads to a false
consequence. On the weaker reading, by contrast, Bolzano is not asserting the falsity
of the infinite summation theorem, but he is merely refraining from asserting its truth,
because what is ostensibly the only argument to prove its truth is a defective argument.
Under the first reading, which we tend to find more natural, the componentwise
definition of the product à la Trlifajová (2018) and Benci and Di Nasso (2003) is simply
inconsistent with Bolzano’s own views, as the infinite summation theorem is true in the













N ` 1qpiq for any




N` 1q “ 2
1
S.




N` 1q “ 2
1




N` 1qqpiq “ 2
1
Spiqu. Now for
any i P ω`, 2
1
Spiq “ 2 ˆ ipi`1q
2













N` 1q “ 2
1
S|| “ ω`,
and therefore is contained in U .
Since we are interested in establishing at least the consistency of Bolzano’s calculation
of the infinite, the stronger reading of this passage of the infinite summation theorem
compels us to provide an alternative definition of the product of two Bolzanian quantities.
Moreover, we find that this conclusion also follows from the second, weaker reading
mentioned above. Indeed, even if Bolzano is merely punting here on the truth of the
infinite summation theorem, we find it quite revealing that he would object to the infinite
summation theorem being a direct consequence of Gauss’s summation theorem. Indeed,
this passing from the finite to the infinite is very similar to the various “arguments by
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cofiniteness” that Bolzano appeals to in §§29 and 32, and which we discussed at length in
the previous section. As we have noticed above, the formal setting of ultrapowers, in which
operations can be defined componentwise, allows for a straightforward reconstruction of
such arguments by cofiniteness, with the help of  Loś’s theorem. In fact, the proof of
Lemma 4.1 above proceeds precisely in the same way as the inference rejected by Bolzano:




N. Bolzano therefore seems to have two distinct attitudes with regard to these
inferences from the finite to the infinite: while he uses arguments by cofiniteness when
establishing results about sums and differences of infinite sums, he explicitly rejects this
style of reasoning when discussing ratios of infinite sums, i.e., results about products of
infinite sums. If we were to model such products componentwise, we would be allowing
in our formal setting precisely the type of inference that Bolzano objects to. This seems
cause enough to us to propose an alternative definition of the products of two Bolzanian
sums.
4.2 Second-order infinities via an iterated ultrapower
As shown above, the componentwise interpretation of the product adopted both by Trli-
fajová and Benci and Di Nasso has unfortunate consequences for our project. If we want
to model Bolzanian computations with the infinite as accurately as possible, we must
therefore propose an alternative interpretation. Our solution springs from the observa-
tion above that the product p
0
Nq2 is written by Bolzano as an infinite sum in which the
summands themselves are infinite quantities. Since we decided to model infinite sums of
integers as functions from an index set ω` into the integers, we should therefore model
infinite sums of possibly infinite quantities as functions from ω` into a structure that
contains those infinite quantities, i.e., into ZU .
Formally, this means that we should now work in an ultrapower of ZU , i.e., in an
iterated ultrapower. Letting pZU q2 denote this ultrapower, we have a straightforward
embedding ι : ZU Ñ pZU q2, induced by the map sending any f : ω` Ñ Z to the map
56
i ÞÑ fpiq, where fpiq is the constant function returning fpiq for any j P ω`. Given an
infinite sum of (possibly infinite) quantities in ZU , say α1`α2`α3` . . . in inf., we pro-
ceed as before by identifying this sum with the countable sequence α :“ pα1, α2, α3, . . . q,
and determining its quantity α as the equivalence class in the iterated ultrapower pZU q2
of the sequence pα1, α1 ` α2, α1 ` α2 ` α3, . . . q, where the partial sums of the first n
terms in α are computed inside ZU . In the case of p
0
Nq2, this means that we identify the








N, . . . q. The corresponding approximating






N, . . . q, which means that p
0
Nq2 is the equivalence class of the
function assigning to each i P ω` the quantity i
0

































S is the equivalence class of the function assigning i
1
S to
each i P ω`.




N , i.e., summing
1
S-
many times the quantity
0








N , we should
take
0













N ` . . . in inf.










N, . . . q,










N is the equivalence class







N to any i ă ω. More generally, given any
two infinite quantities α and β in ZU , we may define the product α.β P pZU q2 as the
equivalence class of the function mapping any i ă ω` to αpiq ˆ β, where αpiq ˆ β “
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β ` β ` . . .` β
loooooooomoooooooon
αpiq times
. The relevant definitions are summarized in the table below:






















































































































αp1qβ ` αp2qβ ` . . . in inf. α.β “ pαp1qβ, αp2qβ, . . . q σpα.βq “ pσpαqp1qβ, σpαqp2qβ, . . . q σpα.βqpiq “ σpαqpiqβ α.β “ σpα.βq˚
Table 2: Representation of Bolzanian products in pZU q2
This definition of the product of two infinite quantities has three important conse-








N above, the product
operation will in general not be commutative. Although this might seem as a highly non-
Bolzanian feature of our setup, we remark that this does not directly contradict any of
Bolzano’s computations in PU. Moreover, contrary to the associativity and commutativ-
ity of addition, which he sees as rooted in the concept of sum and therefore a feature of the
general theory of quantity, associativity and commutativity of multiplication of integers
are introduced as theorems in Part III of his Reine Zahlenlehre, §§19-20, Bolzano 1976,
pp. 62-63, instead of being part of the definition of a product. Moreover, we think that the
non-commutativity of the product of two infinite quantities is itself motivated by Bolza-





















N ` . . . in inf. respectively,
then the Bolzanian strategy for comparing two infinite sums, namely computing their dif-




















Nq` . . . in inf.









Second, it is easy to verify that, under this definition of the product, the summation









N` 1q. Now since
0
N` 1 is (the equivalence class




N` 1q “ iˆ p
0
N` 1q
maps any j P ω` to ipj ` 1q. On the other hand, in pZU q2, 2
1
S maps any i P ω` to
2
1






N ` 1q|| “ ti P ω` : ZU |ù ipi` 1q “ i ˆ p
0
N ` 1qu.
Now for any i, j P ω`, ipi` 1qpjq “ ipi ` 1q, while pi ˆ p
0
N ` 1qqpjq “ ipj ` 1q, hence
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ZU |ù ipi` 1q ă iˆ p
0







Finally, we argue that this definition of the product gives a better interpretation of
Bolzano’s remark that quantities like p
0
Nq2 are infinities of a “higher order”. Indeed, our
construction introduces a clear stratification between integers, infinite quantities of the
first order (i.e., elements introduced in the first ultrapower ZU ), and infinite quantities
of the second order (i.e., elements introduced in the second ultrapower pZU q2). In fact,
in our interpretation, genuine second-order infinite positive quantities are always larger
than any first-order infinite quantity:
Lemma 4.2. Suppose α,β,γ P ZU are such that ZU |ù α ą m^β ą m for any integer
m. Then pZU q2 |ù α.β ą γ.
Proof. We claim that ||α.β ą γ|| P U . This amounts to showing that, for U -many
j P ω`, ||αpjq ˆ β ą γpjq|| P U . Now suppose αpjq ą 0 (which is true for U -many
j P ω`). Then k P ||αpjq ˆ β ą γpjq|| if and only if βpkq ą γpjq
αpjq
, which is true
for U -many k since, letting m be the smallest integer greater than γpjq
αpjq
, we have that
ZU |ù β ą m.
However, an obvious drawback of modelling second order infinite quantities by iter-
ating the ultrapower construction is that we must repeat this procedure again in order
to account for third-order infinite quantities, and so on. In fact, provided we want to
make sense of quantities of the form p
0
Nqn for any natural number n, we must iterate our
ultrapower construction countably many times. This requires us to construct models of
the form pZU qn for any n, with embeddings from each pZU qn into pZU qn`1:
Z ι0 // ZU ι1 // pZU q
2
ι2
// pZU q3 ι3 // . . .
Limits of iterated ultrapowers are a standard tool in mathematical logic. The direct
limit B of this chain of ultrapowers contains quantities of arbitrarily large orders of infinity,
and allows for a rigorous definition of the product α.β of two infinite quantities α and
β. In fact, we obtain a particularly well-behaved structure:
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Theorem 4.3. The structure B “ pB,`,´, 0, 1,ă, .q is a non-commutative ordered ring.
We refer the interested reader to the Appendix for a proof of this theorem as well as
details about the structure B. For now, let us simply conclude that this formal result
establishes that our interpretation of Bolzanian sums yields a rich and original structure
which nonetheless shares many properties with the integers.
5 Reassessing the PU
In the preceding sections we have touched on the following three issues:
1. Whether Bolzano’s work truly was about (something like) the sets of set theory,
or not. We argued that Bolzano’s work in PU §§29-33 is best understood as being
an attempt at giving solid foundations to the handling of infinite series (which
correspond to Bolzano’s infinite sums).
2. Whether part-whole reasoning plays an important role or not in Bolzano’s computa-
tions. We argue that a form of part-whole reasoning about infinite sums, not about
infinite sets, plays a central role in Bolzano’s argument, even though Bolzano’s
argument does not contradict set-theoretic part-whole (PW1 in the Introduction).
3. Whether Bolzano’s relation to what we may call the “first generation” of set theo-
rists (specifically Cantor) needs to be reassessed. We think it does.
In this section, we discuss in detail where we stand on each point in turn, making use
of the formalization from Section 3 and Section 4 whenever necessary.
5.1 A theory of infinite sums
We have argued that Bolzano’s primary interest in PU §§29-33 is in infinite sums of
integers, rather than sets and their sizes. To be more specific, we wanted to illustrate
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that by interpreting these sections as trying (and largely failing) to anticipate Cantorian
inventions, one would fundamentally misrepresent Bolzano’s work. Instead of there being
one notion that, like Cantor’s cardinals (or powers) captures the quantitative aspect of a
collection, Bolzano has rather two quantity notions associated to each of his infinite sums:
the Gliedermenge of the corresponding series of summands, and the sum itself (which for
us would be the value, or the result of performing the infinite addition—Bolzano’s notion
of sum does not allow for a distinction between a sum and its value).
These infinite sums (or the underlying series) can undergo certain transformations,
which may induce a change in the Gliedermenge, a change in the value of the sum, or
both. We saw in Bolzano’s work three examples of such operations:
1. raising all the terms in a sum to the same power;
2. “erasing” some of the terms in a sum;
3. permuting terms in a sum or computing summands in a different order.
§§29 and 33 suggest that raising all natural numbers at once to the same power does




S are obtained from the infinite sum 1 ` 2 ` 3 ` . . . in inf. (i.e.,
1
S) by raising
all terms in this sum to the 0th and 2nd power, respectively. Bolzano explicitly states
in §33 that this operation does not change the Gliedermenge of the corresponding sum,






S. On the other hand, the second
operation, which consists in erasing some of the terms in an infinite sum, does change
the Gliedermenge of the infinite sum in such a way that also induces a change in the





N only in that the first n terms of the sum are removed. Nonetheless,
as we have seen above, this reasoning also appears in §32, where it plays a crucial role in
Bolzano’s rejection of M.R.S’s identification of the infinite sum a´ a` a´ a` . . . in inf.
with the sum within brackets in a´pa´a`a´a`. . . in inf.q. Finally, regarding the third
operation, Bolzano seems to adhere to the idea that because the laws of commutativity
and associativity should always hold for addition, this operation should not change the
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value of the sum if the sum designates any value at all. As we have shown above, Bolzano
uses this criterion to argue that Grandi’s series does not designate any actual quantity,
but seems unaware of the fact that his argument also creates difficulties for infinite sums
like 1 ` 1 ` 1 ` 1 ` . . . in inf. We have also argued that those issues should commit
Bolzano to the thesis that changing the order in which terms are summed in an infinite
sum also changes its Gliedermenge, although he does not explicitly make this point.
In our formalization of Bolzano’s computations, we treat all infinite sums as countable
sequences of integers, to which we associate a countable sequence of partial sums. For
infinite sums which have the same Gliedermenge as
0
N , this can be done in a straight-
forward way by identifying an infinite sum with its sequence of partial sums, and our
ultrapower construction allows us to assign different values to such sums. For infinite




Ga, we only need to make some
natural choices in the way we represent them to retrieve Bolzano’s results. We therefore
believe to have established that Bolzano’s computations in PU form a consistent theory
of divergent infinite sums, which paint a picture of the arithmetic of the infinite largely
different from our modern, set-theoretic, conception. In particular, interpreting Bolzano
as developing a theory of infinite sums allows us to reassess the role that part-whole
considerations play in his theory.
5.2 Part-whole reasoning in Bolzano’s computations
As we have mentioned above, we do not think, pace Berg and Šebest́ık, that Bolzano’s
computations in PU §§29-33 are incompatible with his use of part-whole reasoning in
§§17-24. In fact, we argue that part-whole reasoning plays a central role in Bolzano’s
determination of the relationship between infinite quantities. However, since, as we have
argued, Bolzano is developing in §§29-33 a theory of infinite sums and not a theory
of infinite (set-like) collections, we must exert caution in determining how we should
understand the principle that “the whole is always greater than its proper parts”. The
more common interpretation of this principle (see, e.g., Mancosu 2009) is set-theoretic:
PW1 For any sets A,B, if A Ĺ B, then sizepAq ă sizepBq.
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This formulation of the part-whole principle is, by and large, the one satisfied for
labelled sets of natural numbers by numerosities as defined by Benci and Di Nasso (2003).
In particular, in the numerosity structure xN ,ďy constructed by Benci and di Nasso,
the following holds:
Num For any (labelled) set of natural numbers A and any numerosity ξ, ξ ă numpAq if
and only if there is a (labelled) set B Ĺ A such that numpBq “ ξ.
However, a more general version of the part-whole principle, which avoids set-theoretic
parlance entirely, is given by Bolzano in his Größenlehre. This is to be found in the
definition of “greater than”, which we transcribe here together with the immediately
following remark, which shows that Bolzano is aware of the difficulty his definition of
“less/ greater than” creates for determining relationships between quantities which may
be infinitely large or infinitely small, but adopts it nonetheless:
§27 Def. If the quantity N lets itself be considered as a whole, which includes
in itself the quantity M or one that is equivalent to it as part, then we say
that N is greater than M , and M is smaller than N and we write it as N ąM
or M ă N . Should this much be established, that M is not greater or not
smaller than N ; then we write in the first case M ­ą N and in the second case
M ­ă N .
§28 Remark. What I here pick as definition, that each whole must be greater
than its part, and the part smaller than the whole (as long as they are both
quantities) some, namely already Gregory of St. Vincent and in more recent
times also Schultz (in his Foundations of the pure Mathesis), do not want to
concede, because of quantities which are infinitely large or infinitely small. If
M is infinitely large, but m is finite, or M is finite, but m infinitely small,
then people say that the whole pM ` mq composed from the parts m and
M isn’t to be truly called greater than the part M . [. . . ]14 (Bolzano 1975,
p. 237)
14§.27 Erkl. Wenn sich die Größe N als ein Ganzes ansehen läßt, welches die Größe M oder eine ihr
gleichkommende als ein Theil in sich schließt; so sagen wir, N sey größer als M , M aber kleiner als N
und schreiben dieß N ą M oder M ă N . Wenn um so viel bestimmt werden soll, daß M nicht größer
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The quote above clearly indicates both that Bolzano sees himself as employing some
version of the part-whole principle as the criterion for size comparison between quantities,
and that two quantities A and B are related as whole and part, respectively, if and only
if there is a positive (non-negative, non-zero) quantity C such that A “ B ` C. Then
Bolzano’s definition of less-than (ă) can be formulated as follows:
PW2 For any two quantities A,B, A ă B if and only if there is some positive quantity
C such that A` C “ B.
This latter principle can indeed be seen as preserving the part-whole intuition: if A
is a proper part of B, then the part C of B obtained by removing A from B is non-null,
and clearly its sum with A yields back B. In particular, if the operation of taking the
sum of two quantities has an inverse (removing a part from a whole), then PW2 can be
rephrased as follows:
PW3 For any two quantities A,B, A ă B if and only if B ´ A is positive.
Our claim is that Bolzano is endorsing PW3 when determining order relations be-
tween infinite sums. Note that for PW3 to apply to infinite sums, one needs first to
define two things:
a) the difference α ´ β of two infinite sums α and β;
b) when an infinite sum α is positive.
As we have argued above, Bolzano solves those two issues in his calculation of the infinite
as follows:
a) For two infinite sums α and β having the same Gliedermenge, their difference α´β
is computed termwise: α ´ β is the infinite sum in which the ith term is αi ´ βi,
i.e., the difference of the ith terms of α and β respectively;
oder nicht, kleiner als N sey; so schreiben wir im ersten Falle M ­ą N oder im zweyten M ­ă N .
§28 Anm. Was ich hier als Erklärung annehme, daß jedes Ganze größer als sein Theil, und der Theil
kleiner als das Ganze seyn müsse, (so fern beyde Größen sind), haben Einige, nahmentlich schon Gregor
v. St.Vincenz und in neuerer Zeit auch wieder Schultz (in seinen Anfangsgr. d. rei. Mathesis) in Hinsicht
solcher Größen, die unendlich groß oder klein sind, nicht zugestehen wollen. Wenn M unendlich groß, m
aber endlich ist, oder wenn M endlich, m aber unendlich klein ist; so behauptet man daß aus den Theilen
M und m zusammengesetzte Ganze pM `mq sey nicht wirklich größer als der Theil M zu nennen. [. . . ]
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b) An infinite sum α is positive if all but finitely many of its terms are positive.
Bolzano is thus able to derive from PW3 a sufficient criterion for order relationships
between infinite sums:
PW4 For any two infinite sums α, β, α ă β if all but finitely many terms in β ´ α are
positive.
It is worth noting once again that this criterion is exactly the version of PW3 at play
in Bolzano’s proof that
2
S is infinitely greater than
1
S in §33. Moreover, Bolzano explains
his reasoning in terms of part-whole relationships between sums:
So in fact
2
S may be considered as a quantity which contains the whole of
1
S
as a part of it and even has a second part which in itself is again an infinite
series with an equal number of terms as
1
S, namely:
0, 2, 6, 12, 20, 30, 42, 56, . . . , npn´ 1q, . . . in inf.,
in which, with the exception of the first two terms, all succeeding terms are
greater than the corresponding terms in
1
S, so that the sum of the whole series
is again indisputably greater than
1
S. (PU, §33)
We therefore conclude that the part-whole principle plays an important role in Bolzano’s
computations, but also that, in his calculation of the infinite, Bolzano’s text should not
be interpreted as displaying some instances of part-whole reasoning about sets and their
proper subsets. Rather, in deriving those results, part-whole reasoning is applied to infi-
nite sums in the precise sense of PW4.15 In our formalization of Bolzano’s computations,
15This does not mean that PW4 is the correct interpretation of Bolzano’s part-whole reasoning
throughout the PU . As we have noted in Section 1, Bolzano is clearly committed to a form of part-whole
reasoning about collections in §§19 ´ 24. We also thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that in
the following passage from §29, Bolzano seems to endorse a form of set-theoretic part-whole principle
about continuous magnitudes:
the whole multitude (plurality) of quantities which lie between two given quantities, e.g. 7
and 8, although it is equal to an infinite [multitude] and therefore cannot be determined
by any number however great, depends solely on the magnitude of the distance of those
two boundary quantities from one another, i.e. on the quantity 8 ´ 7, and therefore must
be an equal [multitude] whenever this distance is equal.
This suggests that a more fine-grained analysis might be required in order to fully assess the role that
part-whole reasoning plays in the PU as a whole.
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we have shown that computations with infinite sums based on PW4 could be carried out
in a consistent fashion. In fact, as a simple consequence of the fact that our structure B
is elementarily equivalent to the integers, we have that B |ù @α, βpα ă β Ø β ´ α ą 0q.
Moreover, we have also argued that Bolzano’s criterion could also be applied in a produc-
tive way to determine order relations between infinities of higher order. As a consequence,
we showed how a Bolzanian product of infinite quantities could be interpreted as a non-
commutative monoidal operation, i.e., a well-behaved operation which is nonetheless
considerably different from the product of Cantorian cardinalities or even the product of
numerosities.
Finally, let us note that, although we have argued that the correct way to interpret
Bolzano’s part-whole reasoning does not commit him to the set-theoretic part-whole prin-
ciple (PW1), we nonetheless believe that PW1 is compatible with Bolzano’s arguments.
In fact, we are now in a position to fully describe a way out for Bolzano from the ap-
parent contradiction of §33 (cf. Section 2) that we believe is satisfactory even from a
modern standpoint. Indeed, following the position sketched in Section 2, we may argue
that the number (Menge) of natural squares is not equal to the Gliedermenge of the
infinite sum
2
S but that it must be computed, in relation with
0
N , as the value of the sum
SQ
N “ 10` ` `40`. . . in inf. The approximating sequence of this sum is p1, 1, 1, 2, 2, . . . q,




N ą 0. In other
words, this interpretation avoids making Bolzano’s computations inconsistent with his
adherence to the principle that the whole is always greater than its proper parts. The
price to pay is to argue that the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between natural
numbers and squares does not imply that the two sets have the same size, even though,




S, it is instrumental in establishing that the two sums have
the same Gliedermenge. In fact, this strategy can be generalized to any set of natural
numbers. Indeed, if A Ď ω`, let χA : ω
` Ñ t0, 1u be the characteristic function of A,
i.e., for any n P ω`, χApnq “ 1 if n P A and χApnq “ 0 if n R A. We may then consider
the infinite sum τA “
ř8
i“1 χApiq and identify the number of elements in A with τA. It is
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then straightforward to verify the following fact:
PW5 For any two A,B Ď ω`, if A Ĺ B, then B |ù τA ă τB.
Indeed, if A Ĺ B, let n be the smallest number in BzA, and observe that, for any




i“1 χBpjq “ τBpjq. Thus ||τA ă τB|| is cofinite, so
B |ù τA ă τB. In fact, this “Bolzanian” way of assigning quantities to sets of natural
numbers completely coincides with how a set of natural numbers is assigned a numerosity
when the structure is constructed out of an ultrapower of the natural numbers, as in Benci
and Di Nasso (2003).
We stop short of arguing that this was Bolzano’s position, as we do not believe that
there is enough evidence in the text of PU to make this claim; nor are we convinced that
Bolzano had a notion of sets of natural numbers and of their sizes that would allow him
to conceive of the problem in those terms. Our point, however, is that Bolzano’s compu-
tations with infinite sums, and his attempts to develop a general theory of a calculation
of the infinite, do not, as our formalization makes clear, commit him to a rejection of the
part-whole principle for sets of natural numbers.
5.3 Bolzano and early set theory
Even though our interpretation sees Bolzano as not necessarily concerned with sets and
their cardinalities, this should not be seen as a claim that Bolzano’s work is completely
separate from, and irrelevant for, the historical development of set theory. We believe
that ours is just a more cautious evaluation of the interactions between the PU and the
early development of set theory as seen mainly in Cantor’s work.
What follows is not an exhaustive comparison between Bolzano’s §§29-33 and Canto-
rian set theory but a selective comparison on just a couple of points: the status of infinite
quantities in Bolzano’s and Cantor’s work and the arithmetic of the infinite, respectively.
Insofar as the actual infinite in mathematics is concerned, Bolzano and Cantor are
both advocates for its existence. In addition to defending the existence of the actual in-
finite, Bolzano provides specific examples of infinite multitudes of mathematical objects
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such as the multitude of all natural numbers, which is an infinitely large quantity (PU,
§16). Infinitely large quantities exist, and they are fully legitimate objects for mathe-
matics, meaning their relationships to one another can be computed. Although Bolzano
asserts this in PU §28, he also makes it clear that he is not claiming to be able to express









shorthand for the infinite sum expressions Bolzano concludes with “. . . in inf.”—they
are not separate entities, like cardinals (and ordinals) with respect to sets.16
Indeed, in modern set theory, ordinals are defined as canonical representatives of order
types of well-ordered sets, while cardinals are canonical representatives of equivalence
classes of equipollent sets (i.e., sets that can be bijected with one another). Thus, while
cardinals are sets and each cardinal is the cardinal of itself, in general a set and its cardinal
are two distinct entities. Whether or not Cantor himself held precisely such a view at
some point during his lifetime is a complex issue that depends on how one understands
the role that Cantor assigns to abstraction in his original construction of the transfinite
numbers. Cantor defines the cardinal number or power of a set M to be the result of a
“double act of abstraction” performed on M : first, to abstract from the nature of each
individual element of M , and second, to abstract from the order of the elements relative
to one another. A detailed discussion of the correct interpretation of Cantor’s abstraction
is beyond the scope of this paper, and we therefore refer the interested reader to Hallett
(1984, pp. 119-128) and Mancosu (2016, pp. 52-59).
For our purposes, it suffices to stress that the definition of cardinal Cantor gives is
such that any set, in principle, can be abstracted from twice and hence give rise to its own
cardinal. Thus for instance the cardinal ℵ0 can be obtained from the set of natural num-
bers N by abstracting first from the nature of each single natural number and then from
the order of N as a whole. But one fundamental consequence of Cantor’s double abstrac-
16Florio and Leach-Krouse (2017) have recently proposed a non-objectual interpretation of ordinals.
Provided an analogous treatment can be extended to cardinals, the objectuality of cardinals as a con-
ceptual difference between contemporary set theory and Bolzano’s approach to infinite collections might
appear less significant than what it seems to be right now. However, it would still be the case that
a Cantorian definition by abstraction for cardinals certainly lends itself to a straightforward objectual
interpretation, and thus our point regarding the difference in conception between Cantor and Bolzano
would still hold true.
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tion definition is that any set has a cardinal.17 For Bolzano instead not all infinite strings
of integers can give rise to a sum, as the case of Grandi’s series witnesses, and determin-
ing which such expressions do correspond to a sum is one of the problems he tries to solve.
A second point of comparison between Cantor’s and Bolzano’s treatments of the
infinite is the computations they perform with infinite quantities. They both strive to
give a meaningful account of arithmetical operations (addition and multiplication, but
also subtraction and division, or “ratios” in Bolzano’s case) between transfinite cardinals
and infinite sums. What this means and how they achieve it is however very different for
each of them.
Cardinal multiplication is defined as taking the cardinal of the product of two sets
A,B, and addition is defined as the cardinality of the disjoint union of two sets (according
to Hallett (1984, p. 82) this was already Cantor’s own definition). In the presence of the
axiom of choice, it is an elementary fact of cardinal arithmetic that for any two infinite
cardinals κ, λ, κ ¨ λ “ κ ` λ “ maxtκ, λu. This was already proved in the early 20th
century by Hessenberg and Jourdain, who were able to generalize Cantor’s result that
ℵ20 “ ℵ0 to ℵα ¨ℵβ “ ℵmaxtα,βu (cf. Hallett 1984, pp. 79, 82). They were also able to show
that for addition the same holds, namely ℵα ` ℵβ “ ℵmaxtα,βu. This collapse of addition
and multiplication into taking the greatest of the addends in the addition case, or factors
in the multiplication case, is very far from Bolzano’s approach to computing with the
infinite.
One important similarity between Cantor and Bolzano is that, for both of them, an
actually infinite quantity, like
0
N for Bolzano or ω for Cantor, can be obtained by iterating
a finite operation (adding units for Bolzano, taking successor ordinals for Cantor) on finite
quantities. But they seem to conceive of this process of infinitary addition in different
terms, as evidenced by the role subtraction plays in their respective systems. Cantor does
not define subtraction of infinite cardinals, while, as we have seen, for Bolzano the ability
17Note however that if one reads Cantor as associating to any set not only its equipollence class but also
a canonical well-ordered representative for it, this is actually equivalent to the Well-Ordering Principle
according to which any set can be well-ordered. Therefore, if one were to reject the Well-Ordering
Principle, not all sets would have a Cantorian cardinal.
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to compute the difference between two infinite sums is an essential tool in determining
order relationships between infinite quantities. Moreover, no two infinite cardinals can
have a finite difference, in the sense that for any two infinite cardinals κ, λ, if κ ă λ and
there is a cardinal µ such that κ ` µ “ λ, then µ must be infinite (in fact µ “ λ). Here
again Bolzano’s infinities behave vastly differently, since one of his most basic results is




N have a strictly finite difference, namely n.
Similarly, in §29 we see Bolzano generate new infinities, infinities of higher order,
as he claims, simply by multiplying
0







in stark contrast with Cantor’s result that ℵn0 “ ℵ0, mentioned above. Moreover, we
have argued that a faithful interpretation of Bolzano’s criterion for inequality between
infinite sums implies that the Bolzanian product of two infinite sums should be non-
commutative. In fact, according to us, Bolzanian products are significantly different
from products of cardinals. Bolzano does not conceive of multiplying quantities as akin
to taking Cartesian products of sets. He rather seems to be extending the definition of
multiplication of natural numbers that he had in his Reine Zahlenlehre (Bolzano 1976,
p. 57), without introducing infinite numbers. Just like the product of two finite numbers
mˆn is defined as n` . . .` n
looooomooooo
m times




each unit by n, the product of two infinite quantities α.β may be obtained by writing
the corresponding infinite sum for α and replacing each unit by β, as in the case of p
0
Nq2.
Perhaps surprisingly, this latter feature of Bolzano’s computation may in fact be seen
as the most modern one, especially under our interpretation of the Bolzanian product.
Indeed, by allowing not only his finitary operations, but also his infinitary operations
(like infinite summation) to range over both finite and infinite quantities, Bolzano, just
as Cantor, is able to generate a hierarchy of infinities of ever increasing order.
Conclusion
Our goal was to provide a faithful interpretation of the PU and especially of Bolzano’s
calculation of the infinite as presented in §§29-33. We argued that Bolzano’s computations
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should not be judged as failed attempts at anticipating Cantor’s transfinite arithmetic,
and that Bolzano’s primary interest was not in measuring the sizes of infinite collections
of natural numbers, but in developing an arithmetic of infinite sums of integers. As a
consequence, one should not read Bolzano as failing to anticipate Cantor’s work because
of his commitment to a set-theoretic version of the part-whole principle but rather as
developing from part-whole considerations an original and productive way of reasoning
about infinite sums. Moreover, far from shutting Bolzano out of future historiographies
of set theory, this new interpretation clarifies where Bolzano’s approach to the infinite
stands within that history. The intentions and methods of Bolzano when computing with
the infinitely large are radically different from Cantor’s, yet, as we have shown, amenable
to a consistent mathematical interpretation. We hope that the present work may mark
only the beginning of deeper scholarly engagement with Bolzano’s mathematical infinite.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we describe in more detail the ring of Bolzanian quantities B mentioned
in Section 4.2. In particular, we show how to construct B as a direct limit of iterated ul-
trapowers, define rigorously the product of two infinite quantities, and prove Theorem 4.3.
Let us first note that a standard presentation of our construction would require us to
take a direct limit of the structures:
Z ι0 // ZU ι1 // pZU q
2
ι2
// pZU q3 ι3 // . . .
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where for any natural number n, pZU qn`1 is the ultrapower of pZU qn by U , and each
ιn`1 : pZU qn`1 Ñ pZU qn`2 maps (any equivalence class of) a function f : ω` Ñ ZnU to
the function mapping any i to fpiq. The inconvenience of this approach is that it requires
us to introduce elements of increasing complexity in our structure, i.e., functions from
ω` into the integers, functions from ω` into functions from ω` into the integers, and so
on. However, we may present our construction differently, by drawing on the well known
fact that for any sets A,B and C, there is a canonical bijection φ between functions
from A into CB and functions from A ˆ B into C: given any f : A Ñ CB, the function
φpfq : A ˆ B is such that φpfqpa, bq “ fpaqpbq for any a P A and b P B. Instead of
working with functions of higher and higher complexity, we may therefore simply work
with functions of finite arity, or, equivalently functions from finite sequences of elements
in ω` into Z. However, since we still need to identify functions using an ultrafilter U , we
also need to generalize our definition of when two n-ary functions are equivalent according
to U . This requires the following definition.
Definition 5.1. Let U be a non-principal ultrafilter on ω`. For any natural number n,
we define U n by induction as follows:
• U 0 “ tpω`q0u
• U n`1 is a collection of subsets of pω`qn`1 such that for any X Ď pω`qn`1, X P U n`1
if and only if ti P ω` : X|i P U nu P U , where for any i P ω`, X|i is the set of
n-tuples j in pω`qn such that the n` 1-tuples ij P X.
Note that pω`q0 is the set of all 0-ary sequences of elements of ω`, i.e., contains only
the empty sequence. It is also straightforward to see that, given the previous defini-
tion, U 1 “ U . The following lemma will be useful later on, and is established by a
straightforward induction on the natural numbers.
Lemma 5.2.
• For any natural number n, U n is an ultrafilter on pω`qn which is non-principal if
n ą 0.
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• Let m,n be two natural numbers and X Ď pω`qm`n. Then X P U n`m if and only
if
ti P pω`qm : tj P pω`qn : ij P Xu P U nu P U m.
We can then define the following structures:
Definition 5.3. Let n be a natural number. We let ZU n :“ pZU n ,`,´, 0, 1q be the
ultrapower of Z by U n. More precisely, elements in ZU n are equivalence classes of
functions from pω`qn to Z, where for any two functions f, g : ω` Ñ Z:
• f˚ “ g˚ iff ti P pω`q : fpiq “ gpiqu P U n;
• pf ` gq˚ “ f˚ ` g˚, pf ´ gq˚ “ f˚ ´ g˚;
• f˚ ă g˚ iff ti P pω`q : fpiq ă gpiqu P U n.
In particular, it is straightforward to verify that ZU 0 is isomorphic to Z.
Since U n is an ultrafilter on pω`qn for any natural number n, the previous defini-
tion is a generalization of the original construction of ZU . Moreover, we have natural
embeddings λn : ZU n Ñ ZU n`1 . In fact, those embeddings are always elementary:
Lemma 5.4. For any f : pω`qn Ñ Z, let λnpfq : pω
`qn`1 Ñ Z be such that for any
n-tuple i and any j P ω`, λnpfqpijq “ fpiq. Then the function λn : ZU n Ñ ZU n`1
defined by λnpf
˚q “ λnpfq
˚ is an elementary embedding.
The proof of this lemma is a simple application of the Tarski-Vaught test of elementary
substructures. For any natural numbers m ď n, we let λm,n be the composition of the
embeddings λn´1˝λn`2˝...˝λm`1˝λm. We can then define the structure pB,`,´, 0, 1,ăq
as the direct limit of the system
ZU 0 λ0
// ZU 1 λ1
// ZU 2 λ2
// . . .
We will refer to elements in B as quantities. By definition of the direct limit of a
directed system, quantities are equivalence classes of elements in some ZU n , where for
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any m ď n and any two equivalence classes f˚ P ZU n , g˚ P ZU m , f˚ and g˚ are identified
if and only if ZU n |ù λm,npf˚q “ g˚. For any quantity α, we let the order of α be the
smallest natural number n such that there is some f˚ P α such that f˚ P ZU n . Clearly,
any α P B has a finite order n, and moreover, if α has order n witnessed by some f˚,
then for any natural number m, any g˚ P ZU n`m , and any tuples i and j of length n and
m respectively, fpiq “ gpijq. We may therefore abuse notation and view α as a function
from m-tuples of elements in ω` into Z for any m ě n.
Let α and β be two quantities of order m and n respectively, represented by the
functions fα and fβ of arity m and n respectively. We define the product α.β as (the
equivalence class of) the function fα.β : pω
`qm`n Ñ Z such that for any tuples i and




is straightforward to verify that this operation is well-defined. Indeed, suppose gα P α
and gβ P β are functions of arity m and n respectively. Clearly for any m-tuple i and
any n-tuple j, if fαpiq “ gαpiq and fβpjq “ gβpjq, then gα.βpijq “ fα.βpijq. Moreover,
since fα and gα are U m equivalent, and fβ and gβ are U n equivalent, it follows that for
U m-many i there are U n-many j such that fα.βpijq “ gα.βpijq. Equivalently,
ti P pω`qm : tj P pω`qn : fα.βpijq “ gα.βpijqu P U
n
u P U m,
which by Lemma 5.2 implies that tij P pω`qm`n : fα.βpijq “ gα.βpijqu P U m`n, and
therefore f˚α.β “ g
˚
α.β.
The next lemma establishes that the product of two quantities of order m and n is of
order m` n. The proof is a simple application of  Loś’s theorem.
Lemma 5.5. Let α and β be two quantities of order m and n respectively, and let γ be
a quantity of order l ă m` n. Then B |ù α.β ‰ γ.
Finally, we can now prove Theorem 4.3 and establish that Bolzanian sums and prod-
ucts form a non-commutative ordered ring.
Theorem 5.6. The structure B “ pB,`,´, 0, 1,ă, .q is a non-commutative ordered ring.
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Proof. Note first that by construction, we have an elementary embedding from Z into the
reduct pB,`,´, 0, 1,ăq, which immediately implies that B is an ordered additive group.
We therefore only need to verify the following properties:
• Associativity: Let α, β and γ be three quantities of order l,m and n respectively.
Then for any tuples i, j and k of arity l,m and n respectively, we have that:
α.pβ.γqpijkq “ αpiq ˆ pβ.γpjkqq
“ αpiq ˆ pβpjq ˆ γpkqq
“ pαpiq ˆ βpjqq ˆ γpkq pby associativity ofˆ in Zq
“ pα.βpijqq ˆ γpkq
“ pα.βq.γpijkq.
• Multiplicative identity: Note that any integer z is represented in B by a quantity
z of order 0, which corresponds to the set of all constant functions from finite
sequences of elements in ω` into Z with range tzu. For any quantity α of order
l, we therefore have that α.z and z.α are quantities of order n such that for any




Hence in particular 1.α “ α.1 “ α.
• Left-distributivity: Let α,β,γ be as above. Without loss of generality, assume
that the order m of β is greater than or equal to the order n of γ, which implies
that β ` γ is also of order m. Fix an l-tuple i and an n-tuple j. Note that even
though γ is of lower order, we may still write γpjq. Then:
α.pβ ` γqpijq “ αpiq ˆ pβ ` γpjqq
“ αpiq ˆ pβpjq ` γpjqq
“ pαpiq ˆ βpjqq ` pαpiq ˆ γpjqq pby left-distributivity of ˆ over ` in Zq
“ pα.βpijqq ` pα.βpijqq
“ pα.βq ` pα.γqpijq.
• Right-distributivity: Let α,β,γ as above, and assume the order l of α is greater
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than or equal to the order m of β. Let i be an l-tuple and k a n-tuple. Then:
pα` βq.γpikq “ pα` βpiqq ˆ γpkq
“ pαpiq ` βpiqq ˆ γpkq
“ pαpiq ˆ γpkqq ` pβpiq ˆ γpkqq pby right-distributivity of ˆ over ` in Zq
“ pα.γpikqq ` pβ.γpikqq
“ pα.γq ` pβ.γqpikq.
• Order axiom: Suppose α and β are two quantities of order l and m respectively
and are such that B |ù 0 ă α and B |ù 0 ă β. We claim that B |ù 0 ă α.β.
Indeed, since B |ù 0 ă α, we have that ti P pω`ql : 0 ă αpiqu P U l, while it follows
from B |ù 0 ă β that tj P pω`qm : 0 ă βpjqu P U m. Now clearly for any l-tuple i
such that 0 ă αpiq, if j is an m-tuple such that 0 ă βpjq, then 0 ă αpiq ˆ βpjq,
i.e., 0 ă α.βpijq. Thus
ti P pω`ql : tj P pω`qm : 0 ă α.βpijqu P U mu P U l,
which by Lemma 5.2 implies that tij P pω`ql`m : 0 ă α.βpijqu P U l`m, and hence
B |ù 0 ă α.β.
Let us conclude this appendix with a few remarks regarding the Bolzanian ring of
infinite quantities B. First, our formalization only allows us to represent infinite quantities
of a finite order, i.e., infinite sums of the form αp1q `αp2q `αp3q ` ¨ ¨ ¨ for which there
is an n ă ω` such that for all m ě n, the order of αpmq is less than or equal to the order






Nq3 ` . . . in inf.
Of course, if we wanted to include this sum in our model, we would have to take an
ultrapower of B by U and construct another countable sequence of ultrapowers. In fact, if
76
we wanted to close our domain of infinite quantities under taking infinite sums, we would
need to keep iterating the ultrapower until the first ordinal with uncountable cofinality,
i.e., until ω1. Our structure B, however, is more than enough to account for Bolzano’s
examples, and we certainly do not want to claim that the consistency of Bolzano’s system
requires anything like uncountable ordinals.
Second, it is quite straightforward to observe that the situation described in Lemma 4.2
generalizes to the full structure B. Indeed, for any n, the product of any nth order quan-
tity with at least a first-order infinite quantity is always greater than or smaller than
any quantity of strictly lower order. Thus, in accordance with Bolzano’s original claims,
multiplying infinite quantities together yields new quantities that are infinitely larger or
infinitely smaller than the previous ones in a very strong sense.
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